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This thesis examines the role of building partner medical capacity to strengthen foreign 
security forces as part of Stability Operations. It employs quantitative analysis and Game 
Theory. With the direct benefits of a strong and effective security force medical system 
established, the indirect benefits of a strong security force medical system to a nation-
state, to a region, and to the United States are discussed. Joint doctrine that supports 
efforts to build partner medical capacity is also reviewed. Finally, a framework is 
proposed for strengthening partner security force medical systems through the use of 
advisors, exercises and training, and a rotational presence. Medical development for 
foreign security forces should be a priority of any effort to strengthen a foreign state 
partner. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE .................................................................................4 
B. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................5 
C. APPROACH .....................................................................................................9 
II. SECURITY FORCE BEHAVIOR AND MEDICAL SUPPORT .........................13 
III. THE IMPACT OF CASUALTY/TRAUMA CARE ON SECURITY FORCE 
EFFECTIVENESS: A LARGE-N ANALYSIS .......................................................19 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................19 
B. SOLDIER ADAPTATION MODEL FRAMEWORK ...............................20 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION OF LARGE-N ANALYSIS ..............................21 
D. ASSUMPTIONS .............................................................................................22 
E. STUDY DESIGN ............................................................................................22 
1. Methodology .......................................................................................22 
2. Variables .............................................................................................23 
a. Strain/Outcome: Variable Representing Security Force 
Effectiveness ............................................................................23 
b. The Moderator: Variable to Represent the Provision of 
Medical Support for Security Forces .....................................25 
c. Stressor: Variable Representing the Risk of Personal 
Injury to Security Forces ........................................................26 
3. Database ..............................................................................................26 
4. Additional Definitions of Terms and Secondary Variables ...........29 
F. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ....................................................................30 
1. Medical Support’s Impact on Security Force Productivity ...........30 
2. Level of Risk .......................................................................................32 
3. PHMS as a Reflection of Medical System Quality ..........................34 
4. Limitations ..........................................................................................35 
G. RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................................................36 
H. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................36 
IV. MEDICAL SUPPORT AND THE WILL TO FIGHT: A GAME THEORY 
ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................39 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................39 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION FOR GAME THEORY ANALYSIS ...............40 
C. ASSUMPTIONS .............................................................................................41 
D. METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................42 
E. DEFINING THE GAME ...............................................................................42 
1. The Dilemma ......................................................................................42 
2. Framing the Game .............................................................................43 
a. Variable to represent the provision of medical support .........44 
b. Variable to represent security force effectiveness ..................44 
3. The Games ..........................................................................................45 
 viii 
F. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF GAMES WITH ORDINAL 
VALUES .........................................................................................................46 
1. Game 1: High-Security Environment, Low-Risk of Injury ...........46 
a. Preferences for Game 1: High-Security Environment, 
Low-Risk of Injury ..................................................................46 
b. Game 1: Soldier versus State in Low-Risk Environment ......47 
c. Game 1 Strategic Moves .........................................................48 
2. Game 2: Low-Security Environment, High-Risk of Injury ...........49 
a. Preferences for Game 2: Low-Security Environment, 
High-Risk of Injury .................................................................49 
b. Game 2: Soldier versus State in High-Risk Environment .....50 
c. Game 2 Strategic Moves .........................................................51 
3. Summary of Games and Strategic Moves ........................................51 
G. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF GAMES WITH CARDINAL 
VALUES .........................................................................................................52 
1. Cardinal Scaling .................................................................................52 
2. Cardinal Values for State Preferences .............................................52 
3. Cardinal Values for Soldiers’ Preferences ......................................53 
4. Game 1 and 2 with Cardinal Values ................................................54 
a. Game 1 with Cardinal Values: Soldier versus State in 
Low-Risk Environment ...........................................................55 
b. Game 2 with Cardinal Values: Soldiers versus State in 
High-Risk Environment ..........................................................56 
H. APPLICATION TO AFGHANISTAN ........................................................58 
I. RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................................................61 
J. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................62 
V. THE ADDITIONAL BENEFITS STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY 
FORCE MEDICAL SYSTEM ..................................................................................65 
A. BENEFITS TO THOSE CONSIDERING OR CURRENTLY 
SERVING IN SECURITY FORCES ...........................................................65 
B. BENEFITS TO THE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS ..................................66 
C. BENEFITS TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH SECTOR ..................................68 
D. BENEFITS TO THE STATE .......................................................................69 
E. BENEFITS TO THE REGION ....................................................................70 
F. BENEFITS TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .........................70 
VI. INTERVENTIONS TO BUILD PARTNER MEDICAL CAPACITY .................73 
A. EFFORTS TO RESTRICT LONG TERM MEDICAL 
ENGAGEMENTS ..........................................................................................74 
B. PROVIDING DIRECT CARE TO CIVILIANS AS PART OF 
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS ...............................................75 
C. GUIDANCE FROM CURRENT JOINT DOCTRINE ..............................76 
D. RECENT MEDICAL ADVISING................................................................80 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUILDING PARTNER MEDICAL 
CAPACITY ....................................................................................................82 
1. Building Partner Medical Capacity through Advisors ..................82 
 ix 
2. Building Partner Medical Capacity through Exercises ..................84 
3. Building Partner Medical Capacity through Rotational 
Presence and Exchanges ....................................................................86 
VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....................................................89 
A. AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH .............................................................91 
VIII. APPENDIX A: STATISTICS SUPPORTING LARGE-N ANALYSIS ...............93 
A. POLICE PRODUCTIVITY WITH AND WITHOUT PHMS ..................93 
B. RISK LEVELS WITH AND WITHOUT PHMS .......................................94 
C. EFFECT OF LEVEL OF RISK ON ASSOCIATION BETWEEN 
POLICE PRODUCTIVITY AND THE PRESENCE OF A PHMS UP 
TO 2.5% BOV ................................................................................................96 
D. EFFECT OF LEVEL OF RISK ON ASSOCIATION BETWEEN 
POLICE PRODUCTIVITY AND THE PRESENCE OF A PHMS 
WHEN THE BOV IS GREATER THAN 2.5% ..........................................97 
E. DIFFERENCE IN UNDER-5 MORTALITY FOR STATES WITH 
AND WITHOUT PHMS ...............................................................................98 
IX. APPENDIX B: NOTES SUPPORTING GAME THEORY ANALYSIS ...........101 
A. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................101 
B. SOLIDER PREFERENCES WHEN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
HAS A LOW RISK OF INJURY ...............................................................101 
C. STATE PREFERENCES WHEN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT HAS 
EITHER A HIGH OR LOW RISK OF INJURY .....................................101 
D. PLAYER PREFERENCES WHEN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
HAS A HIGH RISK OF INJURY ..............................................................102 
E. STATE UTILITY VALUE OF POSSIBLE OUTCOMES ......................102 
F. SOLDIER UTILITY VALUE OF POSSIBLE OUTCOMES IN LOW-
RISK ENVIRONMENT ..............................................................................103 
G. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ON LEVEL OF RISK ..................................106 
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................107 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................117 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
  
 xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Soldier Adaptation Model. ...............................................................................16 
Figure 2. Study variables expressed in SAM system. The risk of injury and the 
presence of a pre-hospital medical system represented the independent 
variables influencing police performance, the dependent variable. .................23 
Figure 3. Scatterplot graph of violence levels and police productivity for states ...........29 
Figure 4. Soldiers versus the state. In this game matrix, the four potential outcomes 
are designated by the intersection of each player’s options. ............................45 
Figure 5. Soldiers versus the state with high-security environment/low-risk of injury 
to soldier. In this game, each player has a dominant strategy (for soldiers 
to provide security and for the state to NOT provide health support) that is 
independent of the other player’s choice. As illustrated by the flow 
diagram, outcome AD is a Nash equilibrium as no arrows depart this 
outcome. Nash equilibriums are points where neither player can benefit 
from deviating unilaterally. ..............................................................................47 
Figure 6. Soldiers versus the state with low security environment/high risk of injury 
to soldier. With the change in soldier preferences given the higher risk of 
injury, the soldiers’ preference becomes contingent upon the provision of 
medical care. The likely outcome moves to BD and, as the flow diagram 
illustrates, establishes a new Nash equilibrium. With an increased level of 
risk to the soldiers, the most likely outcome is the least best option for 
both players. .....................................................................................................50 
Figure 7. Interval scaling of cardinal utilities for state outcomes. The relative value 
of each outcome is graphed on the interval scale between zero and 100. 
The graph demonstrates a definite preference by the state to have 
outcomes that involve the provision of security (AC and AD). ......................53 
Figure 8. Decision tree for soldiers’ expected values of providing security in the 
absence or presence of health support with varying levels of risk and 
survival. The variables are defined as the following: x is the probability of 
being injured, y is the probability of surviving if a soldier is injured and 
health support is provided, and z is the probability of surviving if a soldier 
does not have health support. For this analysis, the probability of surviving 
an injury/illness if medical support is provided (y) is 95%,  the survival 
rate after U.S. medical training in El Salvador in 1983. The probability of 
surviving an injury/illness if medical support is not provided (z) is 55%, 
which was the survival rate in El Salvador prior to the U.S. medical 
support training. The values at the terminal nodes represent the value of 
the various outcomes........................................................................................54 
Figure 9. Game 1 - Soldiers versus the state with low risk of injury to soldiers (1%) 
using cardinal values. The values of the players’ preferences mirror those 
of the game with ordinal values. Both players continue to have a dominant 
strategy with an expected outcome of AD. This outcome, AD, continues to 
be a Nash equilibrium. .....................................................................................55 
 xii 
Figure 10. Soldiers versus the state with high-risk of injury to soldiers (67%) using 
cardinal values. As with Game 2 with ordinal values, the soldiers’ decision 
is contingent upon the provision of health support. With both players 
playing conservatively, the likely outcome is BD and represents a Nash 
equilibrium. In this outcome, the soldiers do not provide security and the 
state does not provide medical support. ...........................................................56 
Figure 11. Soldier’s Expected Value to Provide Security with Increasing Risk. As the 
risk of injury increases to security personnel, the expected value of 
providing security decreases at a greater rate when casualty/trauma care is 
not provided. When provided, casualty/trauma care mitigates the increased 
risk and prevents it from crossing the threshold where soldiers will not 
provide security. ...............................................................................................57 
Figure 12. Health Services Support Activities in Civil-Military Operations ....................78 
Figure 13. Phases to support public health programs. .......................................................79 
Figure 14. Framework for a Hypothetical Building Partner Capacity-Health Training 
Program ............................................................................................................85 
Figure 15. Generic Metrics for the Four Phases of a BPC-Health Effort .........................86 
 
 xiii 
LIST OF TABLES 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AFSOC U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command 
ALP Afghan Local Police 
ANA Afghan National Army 
ANP Afghan National Police 
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces 
BOV Burden of Violence 
BPC Building Partner Capacity 
COCOM Combatant Command 
CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies 
DALY Disability-Adjusted Life Year 
DoD Department of Defense 
FAO Foreign Area Officer 
FID Foreign Internal Defense 
FM Field Manual 
GBD Global Burden of Disease 
HEUNI European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control 
IGO International Governmental Organization 
IHS International Health Specialist 
IO International Organization 
ISAF International Security Forces – Afghanistan 
ISCJ International Statistics on Crime and Justice 
JP Joint Publication 
MAST Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic 
MHS Military Heath System 
MMTT Mobile Medical Training Team 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO Nongovernmental Organization 
PHMS Pre-hospital Medical System 
PP Police Productivity 
PRIO International Peace Research Institute 
 xvi 
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 
SAM Soldier Adaptation Model 
SFA Security Force Assistance 
SSTR Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction 
UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
UN United Nations 
U.S. United States 
USG United States Government 




I wish to thank my Lord and Creator who provides me strength and hope through 
faith that work done in his name will have lasting value. To my wife, Lisa, who 
understands my call to help others in the hospital or the battlefield, thank you for your 
patience with my long days in the library, your welcome smile, and your excellent editing 
and feedback. I could not have done my thesis without you. I would like to thank my 
three boys, Tyler, Seth, and Zach, for their patience and understanding when I had to 
study or work instead of throwing the football, jumping on the trampoline, swimming at 
the pool or riding bikes. You are the most important people in my life and I couldn’t have 
finished my thesis without your support. 
 I am indeed grateful to the Defense Analysis faculty for their support, dedication 
to teaching, and academic rigor. Your academic excellence set a standard for me to strive 
for and your encouragement helped me grow as a student and thinker. My special thanks 
goes to Professor Simons and Professor Fox for their patience, guidance and 
encouragement during my work on my thesis. Professor Simons encouraged me to think 
big and tackle a project that was important to me and helped me to coherently organize 
my thoughts. Professor Fox reminded me how fun and helpful math can be when applied 
to real-world problems. I would also like to thank each of my professors who instructed 
me in class for their individual attention and teaching. I will leave this program a better 
officer and thinker than when I arrived.  
 I am thankful to SOCOM for sponsoring my education here at NPS and to those 
within the Special Operations community that supported my attendance. I look forward to 
applying what I have learned supporting you and the mission. 
Finally, I wish to thank the men and women I have served with during my 
military career. Your dedication and enthusiasm pushed me to be a better leader, 
physician, and officer. We are a team, and I am honored to serve with you caring for our 
nation’s warriors. 
 xviii 




“Developing global partnerships” is the new strategic buzz phrase. In an era rife 
with disagreements about how best to conduct state-building and post-conflict 
reconstruction, all stakeholders appear to agree on the value of establishing or 
strengthening partner security forces to increase social stability and set the conditions for 
development. Over the past decade, Security Force Assistance (SFA) and Foreign 
Internal Defense (FID) have gained prominence as promising instruments of policy.1  As 
either an exit strategy for large-footprint post-conflict scenarios or a small-footprint 
intervention to prevent future conflict in weak, failing, or partner states, SFA/FID 
supports the essential security pillar of development and nation-building, and advocates 
equipping others with capacity and capabilities to conduct security operations without 
significant outside assistance. 
While previously the predominant domain of Special Operations forces, SFA/FID 
doctrine and institutions have experienced a rapid growth as Special Forces units could 
not meet the increasing needs demanded by recent conflicts. Granted stature as the 
cornerstone of U.S. exit strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, security advisor and training 
teams were cultivated using conventional and augmentee forces. The scale of these 
requirements, though necessary for the current conflicts, challenged the future direction 
of military force structure. Was this going to be the new normal?  The President’s new 
                                                 
1. Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, defines FID as “…the participation by civilian and 
military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other 
designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, 
and other threats to their security.” In comparison, Stability Operations (FM 3–07) defines Security Force 
Assistance as “the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host- nation, or regional security 
forces in support of a legitimate authority.” Significant overlap between these two missions exists. There is 
current debate on the extent of the differences between these two missions and the legal implications of 
considering them part of the same mission. Broadly speaking, FID dwells in the realm of Special 
Operations, while Security Force Assistance resides with the military’s General Purpose forces. The 
following clarifications attempt to clarify the differences between SFA and FID. “At operational and 
strategic levels, both SFA and FID focus on preparing [foreign security forces (FSF)] to combat 
lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism from internal threats; however, SFA also prepares FSF 
to defend against external threats and to perform as part of an international coalition as well. FID and SFA 
are similar at the tactical level where advisory skills are applicable to both. Both FID and SFA are subsets 
of [Security Cooperation (SC)]. Neither FID nor SFA are subsets of each other.” For the purposes of my 
thesis, the two terms are interchangeable in regard to their focus on building partner capacity to perform 
security operations with minimal external support. 
 2 
strategic guidance provided a definitive answer, “…U.S. forces will no longer be sized to 
conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”2    
The role and mission of SFA/FID, though, do not appear to be receding. Nor are 
they likely to belong to Special Operations alone. The potential for small advisor/training 
teams to strengthen foreign security forces and foster strategic partnerships has made the 
SFA/FID concept an attractive diplomatic/development tool to help preempt future 
conflicts. If a state can secure its own borders and deny access by terrorists and 
extremists to its under-governed areas, the state will be stabilized and set the conditions 
for economic growth and development.  
At its root, SFA aims to build capacity in U.S. partner nation-states.3 While other 
benefits may be produced secondary to the capacity-building effort, such as increased 
access, influence or intelligence, any activity that fails to primarily focus on the 
development and cultivation of partner capacity falls outside of the SFA domain.4 
Applying the “teach a man to fish” metaphor for security operations, SFA assumes that, 
in the long term, U.S. interests are best served if partner nation-states can protect and 
defend themselves without an overt or extensive U.S. military presence. The stated goal 
of SFA is “…to assist host countries to defend against internal and transnational threats to 
stability.”5 
Maturing over the past decade in Afghanistan and Iraq under the auspices of 
Stability Operations, U.S. government policy has directed the use of SFA as a facet of 
Building Partner Capacity (BPC) and a U.S. Department of Defense priority equivalent to 
combat preparation. In 2005, DoD Directive 3000.05 “Military Support for Stability, 
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” defined a stability 
operation as the 
                                                 
2. Department of Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” 
January 2012, 6, http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. 
3. This also includes aspects of FID relating to building partner capacity to strengthen internal defense 
forces and capabilities. 
4. Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, Security Force Assistance: Candidate Joint 
Doctrine Publication, June 2012. 
5. Department of Defense, “Security Force Assistance (SFA),” DoD Directive 5000.68, October 27, 
2010, 2.  
 3 
...overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and 
activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other 
instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure 
environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency 
infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.6 
Medical contributions to Stability Operations and its new doctrine initially tended 
to focus on either the delivery of healthcare by U.S. forces (e.g., humanitarian assistance 
or disaster response missions that focused on direct care) or the provision of  
medical/health support for military organizations conducting Stability Operations 
missions. There was little focus on how the Military Health System (MHS) could directly 
contribute to Stability Operations, other than as a supporting effort.     
In 2010, however, DoD Instruction 6000.16, “Military Health Support for 
Stability Operations,” expanded the role of the MHS in Stability Operations by directing 
it to “be prepared to perform any tasks assigned to establish, reconstitute, and maintain 
health sector capacity and capability for the indigenous population when indigenous, 
foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals cannot do so.”7 
 That same month in Foreign Affairs, Secretary Gates provided further guidance 
and focused DoD policy by advocating a strategy of building partner capabilities.  
Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches—primarily 
through building the capacity of partner governments and their security 
forces—to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require 
costly and controversial direct military intervention.8 
 The MHS has been adjusting to this new mission by exploring how it can support 
the BPC mission. A recent RAND study for the U.S. Air Force Special Operations 
Command (AFSOC), “Building Partner Health Capacity with U.S. Military Forces,” 
explores the use of medical assets to support the BPC mission and reviews current efforts 
in medical BPC. The study builds upon AFSOC’s concept, unveiled in 2009, 
                                                 
6. Department of Defense, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction 
(SSTR) Operations,” DoD Directive 3000.05, November 28, 2005. 
7. Department of Defense, “Military Health Support for Stability Operations,” DoD Instruction 
6000.16, May 17, 2010. 
8. Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance,” 
Foreign Affairs 29, no. 3 (May 2010): 2–6.  
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 …that rather than using U.S. military medical presence in developing 
countries to directly treat indigenous communities and supplement or 
replace inadequate local care, U.S. advisors would engage and train local 
health workers in a systematic and sustained way through health-focused 
security cooperation.9 
This excellent study provides a framework for conducting BPC-H (a term coined by 
RAND as Building Partner Capacity-Health) and proposes pragmatic and realistic metrics 
of effectiveness. The RAND study, however, fails to adequately consider focusing the 
MHS BPC efforts in the SFA domain. Instead, the use of military medicine to support 
BPC/Stability Operations has jumped from providing direct care to civilians (e.g., 
Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Response, and large-scale Stability Operations) to 
teaching and training the civilian health sector. Consequently, the role of the MHS to 
build capacity in the partner security medical system goes unmentioned, presumably 
because the intent is to build security by directly strengthening a partner’s entire health 
system. In contrast, my thesis advocates that the MHS should first focus on medical BPC 
as part of SFA, and only then use that strengthened institution to improve the civilian 
medical sector. Strengthening a partner state’s security force medical system directly 
supports the security sector and has the potential to generate attractive secondary 
benefits.  
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
My thesis explores the role of medical support development to strengthen partner 
nation-states’ security forces. It also describes how medical capacity-building supports 
the goals and objectives of SFA under the paradigm of BPC. While U.S. military medical 
resources and technical skills support various missions throughout the world, my analysis 
concentrates on the role of military medical capacity-building to strengthen the security 
institutions of partner states and to develop partnerships for future contingencies.  
                                                 
9. David E. Thaler, Gary Cecchine, Anny Wong, and Timothy Jackson, “Building Partner Health 
Capacity with U.S. Military Forces: Enhancing AFSOC Health Engagement Missions,” RAND Project Air 
Force Technical Report (2012), iii, http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1201.html. 
 5 
B. BACKGROUND 
Strengthening the security sector of a country, whether via the military or police 
forces, focuses on the capacity, capabilities, and professionalism of the security 
institutions and security providers. At its heart, establishing and maintaining security 
requires the legitimate and legal application of force in the context of an equitable justice 
system.10 The skills learned and refined through SFA equip partner state security 
personnel to perform the security mission effectively. When challenged, however, the 
security officer is invariably exposed to risk of injury or death. Security personnel who 
aren’t willing to accept some physical risk will either avoid it by marginally performing 
their duties or by over-responding to any threat of violence. Either outcome is undesirable 
and impacts the legitimacy of the security force and the state. Meanwhile, if members of 
the security forces accept the risk of injury and are wounded, they reasonably expect care 
from a competent and capable medical network to mitigate their injuries. Without that 
medical network, the willingness of security officers to perform their duties, e.g., to place 
themselves in mortal danger, may be compromised. 
While the U.S. military medical system currently engages in numerous 
strengthening endeavors with foreign partners, especially in the areas of 
humanitarian/disaster assistance, bioterrorism, and infectious disease threats, there is little 
emphasis given to supporting SFA. To its credit, especially in Afghanistan, the coalition 
military medical system has provided essential care to wounded security forces injured in 
the conduct of their duties. This quality care girds the resolve of the security forces when 
they are conducting their missions. It is unclear how these security forces will perform 
once medical support is no longer provided by coalition medical units. While there have 
been some intermittent efforts to mentor and train indigenous medical providers, these 
efforts have been sporadic and tend to be at the whim of individual medical commanders.   
At the tactical level, Building Partner Medical Capacity has been focused on first 
responders. While first responder training is critical, without concurrent capacity-building 
                                                 
10. Extensive debate exists on the interdependence between security and development in fragile and 
weak states. See Danielle Beswick and Paul Jackson, Conflict, Security and Development: An Introduction 
(New York: Routledge, 2011). 
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of the critical medical infrastructure needed beyond initial field care, care stops with the 
first responder. When U.S. medical units have conducted medical engagements, they 
have tended to provide direct care to civilians or have engaged in public health 
development, not training partner state medical personnel.   
In Phase 4 operations, such as those underway in Afghanistan, compulsory 
missions to develop the indigenous health system through the lens of SFA should both 
focus medical engagement endeavors and create a lasting capability for security forces 
when U.S. forces depart. As a Phase 0 operation, medical training could provide a 
powerful incentive for the development of military/civilian medical partnerships. It 
would enable the military medical system to meet its requirements to support SFA and 
stability operations within its core competencies. And it could help prevent future conflict 
by strengthening the security in a partner state.   
Strategic, operational, and tactical-level commanders have recently extended the 
use of their medical resources beyond the care of combatant troops to care for and 
interact with civilians on the battlefield. While initially done in accord with humanitarian 
principles (to meet the needs of those suffering), the positive effects of these missions led 
to a policy of using medical care to garner civilian political support, commonly known as 
“Winning Hearts and Minds.”  Since the inception of this practice during the Vietnam 
era, the use of military medicine in support of political goals has steadily increased, 
especially in the context of fighting counterinsurgencies and with the rise of Stability 
Operations.  
While the amount of military medical research focused on improving the delivery 
of healthcare to our soldiers on the battlefield continues to expand, the body of research 
questioning the “Hearts and Minds” mission is growing, as well.11 At the root of this 
criticism is the reality that the provision of good medical care occurs in a networked 
system over time. Unfortunately, most “Hearts and Minds” medical engagements have 
consisted of high-quantity, low-quality medical care without any access to further 
                                                 
11. Robert F. Malsby, III, “Into Which End Does the Thermometer Go? Application of Military 
Medicine in Counterinsurgency: Does Direct Patient Care by American Service Members Work?” 
(Master’s thesis, Army Command and General Staff College, 2008). 
 7 
diagnostic testing or evaluations for definitive diagnoses or care. Metrics and success 
have been centered on the “number of patients treated,” leading one to wonder about the 
quality of that treatment if several hundred patients are seen in one day. When balancing 
the questionable medical benefits of these operations against the risk of injury to our 
soldiers and physicians when conducting them, their relative benefits become 
questionable.   
Confusion about balancing the risks against the value of these missions grows 
from their nebulous purpose. Although they offer an excellent venue and tactic for 
collecting information, engaging with the population, and creating public relations 
stories, the use of medical events for these purposes has likewise been criticized by the 
international health community and has led to charges that they “militarize the 
humanitarian space.”12 In response, missions are cast as fulfilling humanitarian 
principles. When these events, however, fail to use techniques that would lead to long-
term improvements and when they expose our forces to risks with questionable gains, 
many of the participants involved grow disillusioned. After all, soldiers do not sign up to 
be injured while handing out aspirin. This is especially true for medical personnel who 
see little medical value in many of these missions and instead perceive them as “dog and 
pony” shows planned to either demonstrate that the command is doing something, or to 
make the participants feel good about themselves for helping others. In some instances, 
such as in Afghanistan, policy now strictly prohibits the use of medical engagements for 
what were some of their most useful tactical and operational purposes, to collect 
intelligence and biometrics.13  
The challenges of strengthening a foreign state’s medical system, as opposed to 
providing direct care, are well documented from Vietnam to the present. In his book 
Military Medicine to Win Hearts and Minds, Dr. Robert Wilensky catalogs his research 
and experience as a military physician in Vietnam during the 1960s-1970s. Even with 
                                                 
12. Pierre Krahenbuhl, “The Militarization of Aid and its Perils,” Intercross, September 26, 2011, 
http://intercrossblog.icrc.org/blog/militarization-aid-and-its-perils. 
13. International Security Assistance Force, “ISAF Guidance on Military Medical Engagement in 
Health Sector Reconstruction and Development and COMISAF Directive: ISAF Medical Involvement in 
Civilian Health Care,” ISAF Standing Operating Procedure 01154, November 9, 2010. 
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medical programs designed to build partner medical capacity, the “…tendency of the 
Vietnamese to allow U.S. military and civilian advisors to carry out tasks rather than to 
learn to do them would persist throughout much of the war, both within the medical 
setting and elsewhere.”14  This tendency invariably leads to a shift to direct care and 
inhibits indigenous medical growth. Local medical systems are often left worse off in the 
long run, especially when a U.S. unit moves to another location or is forced to stop 
providing care to local patients, whether these are members of the security forces or 
civilians. As Wilensky relates one battalion surgeon’s view, “It appeared to [Dr.] Allred 
that as long as services were provided by U.S. forces, there was no effort by the 
[Government of Vietnam] to establish a permanent system to provide such services.”15  
This phenomenon persists in today’s conflicts. 
So, what might be better?  How might medical engagements and partnerships 
better contribute to our nation’s strategy? A recent assessment by the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) by Bonventre, Hicks, and Okutani attempts “to 
frame health and security in terms of the ‘opportunities’ they present to advance both the 
United States’ objectives and the quality of global health care.”16  In evaluating the U.S. 
policy of using global health development as a tool of “soft power,” the paper addresses 
the role of the Department of Defense as part of this initiative.  
More controversial, however, is DoD’s growing peacetime civil-military 
health activity—which DoD calls humanitarian assistance, but which more 
closely resembles what civilian agencies call development. Such activities 
include well drilling, constructing or repairing clinics, and hospital ship 
visits. DoD refers to these peacetime activities as “shaping” or “phase 0” 
activities because they prepare its personnel for their combat and 
postcombat roles, which follow as phases 1 to 6. Stewart Patrick laments, 
however, that “what DoD calls phase 0 is what we used to call foreign 
policy.” A clear benefit would be gained by more precisely defining which 
of these peacetime activities truly contribute to fulfilling the principles of 
                                                 
14. Robert J. Wilensky, Military Medicine to Win Hearts and Minds: Aid to Civilians in the Vietnam 
War (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2004). 
15. Ibid., 93. 
16. Eugene V. Bonventre, Kathleen H. Hicks and Stacy M. Okutani, “U.S. National Security and 
Global Health: An Analysis of Global Health Engagement by the U.S. Department of Defense,” A Report 
of the CSIS Global Health Policy Center – Working Draft. April 2009, 2, http://csis.org/publication/us-
national-security-and-global-health. 
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security and stability, and by ensuring that these often short-term efforts 
set the stage for the long-term development and conflict-mitigation efforts 
of civilian agencies, rather than competing or interfering with long-range 
goals or threatening the impartiality of nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) that claim to abide by these principles.17 
In keeping with the sentiment expressed in the CSIS paper, my thesis will focus 
on strengthening partner security forces “by, with, and through” their medical system. 
Strengthening a medical system requires engagement at all levels of the medical network 
and requires addressing tactical level capability at each node and connection of the 
network, with the aim of delivering healthcare. Medical resources for these missions exist 
in both the Special Operations and General Purpose Forces. More importantly, the bulk 
of the technical expertise and ability to teach the delivery of healthcare above the first 
responder level exists in the medical departments of the U.S. military services.  
Again, unfortunately until recently, little attention has been paid to strengthening 
the medical systems supporting security forces as an important aspect of BPC above the 
first responder level. Recent updates to Joint and Service Doctrine have begun to include 
programs that support medical development for security forces as part of an indirect 
approach and in support of development goals.18  Concurrently, the development 
community is reconsidering the role of security in development. “Engagement with 
security forces, though not traditionally a focus of development, is now regarded as 
crucial for enhancing human security and creating an environment in which development 
can take place.”19 
C. APPROACH 
My thesis seeks to answer the primary research question: “To what extent should 
medical SFA play a more significant role in strengthening partner security forces and 
BPC?”  To fully address this question, the thesis addresses five supporting questions:  
                                                 
17. Ibid., 5. 
18. Foreign Internal Defense (JP 3-22), JP 3–57, Civil-Military Operations (JP 3–57), Health Service 
Support (JP 4-02), Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (JP 3–29), Civil Affairs Operations (FM 3–57), and 
Force Health Protection in a Global Environment (FM 4–02).  
19. Beswick and Jackson, Conflict, Security and Development: An Introduction, 22. 
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1. How does health care impact the disposition of security forces?  
 
2. Does casualty/trauma care impact the effectiveness of security forces? 
 
3. Why does casualty/trauma care impact the effectiveness of security forces? 
  
4. What are the benefits of a strong medical system to support security forces? 
 
5. How can military medical partnerships build capacity to strengthen partner 
nation-states? 
My thesis sequentially tackles these questions in the following sections. 
Chapter II reviews previous research that investigates the factors influencing 
security force performance. The Soldier Adaptation Model (SAM) is introduced and is 
used to frame the various factors influencing soldier behavior and performance, such as 
casualty/trauma care’s ability to mitigate the risk of injury. 
Chapter III uses a large-n analysis to investigate the impact of varying levels of 
risk and casualty/trauma care on the performance of security forces. Using deductive 
hypothesis testing, the analysis suggests a strong relationship between the provision of 
casualty/trauma care and security force performance. 
Chapter IV focuses the lens of game theory on the availability of casualty/trauma 
care to influence security force performance and the willingness of a state to invest in 
casualty/trauma care. Utility theory assists in exploring the role of risk on security force 
behavior and the mitigating effects of casualty/trauma care. Available strategies to 
influence the Other’s behavior are reviewed and applied to contemporary Afghanistan to 
explore their implications. 
With the importance of medical support to security forces established, Chapter 5 
explores the additional benefits of ensuring that partner states possess a strong medical 
system to support security forces. The strengthening aspects of a strong security medical 
system permeate all levels of the security domain, from the individual security officer to 
its international partners. 
Chapter VI considers how U.S. military medical organizations can build partner 
capacity through medical SFA. It will make the case that initially focusing health BPC 
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efforts on medical SFA strengthens security and develops critical medical partnerships 
within the security forces. In addition, prioritizing medical SFA creates a cohort of 
trained security force medical personnel who could be leveraged to assist their own 
civilian sector without U.S. assistance, thereby increasing state legitimacy by providing 
essential services using internal resources and supporting civic action programs. 
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II. SECURITY FORCE BEHAVIOR AND MEDICAL SUPPORT 
There is neglible research investigating the impact of various levels of 
casualty/trauma care on the performance of security forces. Most studies of combat 
medical care focus on clinical treatment and improving the military medical system, 
thereby decreasing the morbidity and mortality of injuries sustained on the battlefield. 
These advances lead modern security institutions to invest significant sums in 
developing, equipping, maintaining, and deploying medical support for their forces. 
Because they understand the dangers associated with providing security in areas of 
increased violence, most modern countries increase their investment in medical support 
as the risk of injury increases. Why do they do so? One might argue that a state has a 
responsibility to provide healthcare to security forces when the forces it sends to do the 
state’s business face an increased risk of injury. One might also suggest that members of 
a security force will be more aggressive and accept greater risk of injury if they know 
there is a competent medical support system in place to care for them should they be 
injured. It seems reasonable to predict that members of security forces will modify their 
behavior to minimize their risk of injury when the state fails to provide medical support 
to their operations.  
While no one has specifically looked at the effects of health support on the 
performance of security forces, research in the area of work motivation theories assists in 
understanding the factors that affect organizational behavior and provides a framework to 
understand organizational performance. The military’s culture and organization have 
proven quite different from those found in the civilian world. While most of the work 
motivation research has been conducted on U.S. military forces, the resulting framework 
can be used to analyze motivational behavior in various contexts, though application of 
this research to foreign security forces must include appropriate cultural and historical 
considerations in order to draw correct conclusions. 
Maria Grazia Galantino summarizes traditional discussions about soldier 
motivation as an “attempt to answer some old and uneasy questions: why do men fight? 
why are they willing to kill and—especially—why are they ready to sacrifice their 
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lives?”20 She continues by arguing that empiric research and efforts to operationalize 
answers to these questions developed alongside social psychology and behavior theory. 
Since World War II, this research has culminated in three main theories about work 
motivation in the military: social, rational economic, and self-actualization needs of 
individuals.21  
The social approach developed from research conducted by Samuel Stouffer. 
Published in 1949, American Soldier evaluates the motivation of soldiers fighting in 
World War II and emphasizes the importance of the workplace to meet an individual’s 
social needs for communication, affiliation, and social interaction. Stouffer’s research 
concludes that soldiers fight for those in their immediate cohort and attach little 
importance to patriotism or idealistic concerns. Since then, the axiom that soldiers “fight 
for each other” has become a common part of the military lexicon.22  Following the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, Leonard Wong re-examined Stouffer’s conclusions. Dr. Wong’s 
report, Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War, echoes Stouffer’s findings, 
highlighting social pressure as a motivation for fighting.23 
The rational-economic approach to understanding soldier motivation is based on 
rational decision-making and the assumption that reward systems create a self-motivated 
workforce.24 With the transition away from compulsory military service in the U.S. and 
the establishment of an all-volunteer army in the 1970s, this approach flourished as the 
military began competing with the civilian workforce for recruits.25  Managing an 
                                                 
20. Maria G. Galantino, “Work Motivation and the Peacekeeper,” in The Psychology of the 
Peacekeeper: Lessons from the Field, ed. Thomas W. Britt and Amy B. Adler, 111–125 (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 2003), 111–112. 
21. Ibid. 
22. David A. Petraeus, “CIA Director’s Remarks at Furman University’s Wilkins Legislative and Civic 
Awards Ceremony,” Central Intelligence Agency, January 27, 2012, https://www.cia.gov/news-
information/speeches-testimony/2012-speeches-testimony/directors-remarks-at-furman-universitys-
wilkins-legislative-and-civic-awards-ceremony.html. 
23. Leonard Wong, Thomas A. Kolditz, Raymond A. Millen, and Terrence M. Potter, Why They Fight: 
Combat Motivation in the Iraq War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub179.pdf. 
24. Edward E. Lawler, Motivations in Work Organizations (Monterrey, CA: Brooks, 1973). 
25. James Burke, “Patriotism and the all-volunteer force,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 
12 (1984): 229–241. 
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effective, business-like organization and financial rewards were seen as the best way to 
attract and retain qualified recruits.26  This ultra-rational approach faced challenges, 
however, as society became less calculating and adopted post-materialist values.27  
Factors affecting quality of life and the contribution of one’s work to one’s potential for 
self-fulfillment began to influence soldiers’ motivations to serve, thus resulting in the 
self-actualization approach to service. 
All three of these approaches minimized or undervalued the role of patriotism and 
a soldier’s political values in his/her decision to fight. As early at 1976, Bowers argued 
against the absence of these factors. He stated “the traditional American values of 
independence and material success still are important and are likely to remain so for the 
immediate future.”28 
Based on the research described, and given the need to develop a better 
framework to understand work motivation, the Soldier Adaptation Model (SAM), was 
devised by Bliese and Castro to provide a “broad conceptual scheme that can be used to 
organize constructs of phenomena within the domain of military stress research.”29  
Viewed as a meta-theory on which to build a theoretical framework to guide research and 
generate hypotheses, the SAM yields a superstructure for a unified understanding of 
military work motivation.  
In the SAM, all theoretical constructs are categorized into one of three 
components: stressors, moderators, or strains/outcomes (See Figure 1). Careful 
delineation of the components points to the expected relationship among variables and 
                                                 
26. John H. Faris, “The Social Psychology of the Military Service and the Influence of Bureaucratic 
Rationalism,” in The Military. More than just a Job? eds. C.C. Moskos & R.R. Wood, 57–65 (New York: 
Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988). 
27. Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political change 
in 43 Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
28. David G. Bowers, “Work-related attitudes of military personnel,” in The Social Psychology of 
Military Service, eds. N.L. Goldman & D.R. Segal, 89–115 (Beverly Hills, London: Sage, 1976), 95. 
29. Paul D. Bliese and Carl Andrew Castro, “The Soldier Adaptation Model (SAM): Applications to 
Peacekeeping Research” in The Psychology of the Peacekeeper: Lessons from the Field, ed. Thomas W. 
Britt and Amy B. Adler, 185–203 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 186. 
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creates a shared terminology for the advancement of theory development and 
investigation.30  
 
Figure 1.  Soldier Adaptation Model.31 
The first component, stressors, refers to all aspects of the environment that “place 
a load or demand on the soldier.”32 This includes inputs experienced by the soldier, e.g., 
weather, duty responsibilities, role ambiguity, workload, family separation, and danger. 
Many of these stressors will vary by location and time, while some are intrinsic to 
working in a security institution. 
The second component of the SAM, moderators, represents actions taken to 
buffer or mitigate the effects of stressors on the third component of the model, strains. 
While some moderators are cultivated prior to exposure to prepare soldiers for anticipated 
stressors, they also include behaviors and psychological defense mechanisms taken by 
soldiers to protect themselves against unforecasted stressors. The position of moderators 
between the stressors and strains/outcomes in the SAM highlights their importance in 
shaping the effectiveness of both units and the individuals who comprise those units. 
Moderators can be further subdivided into: individual moderators, such as individual 
preparedness, efficacy, job involvement, and resiliency; unit moderators, such as 
                                                 
30. Ibid., 187. 
31. Ibid., 188. 
32. Ibid. 
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leadership, group efficacy, and collective training; and organizational moderators, such as 
policy decisions, funding, and strategic vision. Similar to the different levels of military 
operations (tactical, operational, and strategic), moderators must work in concert across 
all three levels. Bliese and Castro argue that “soldier well-being and performance is at its 
peak when moderation at each of the three levels, the individual, the group, and the 
organization, is maximal.”33  
The last component of the SAM, strains, represents the output of stressors 
mitigated by moderators. “Strains represent outcomes.”34  Bliese and Castro divide 
strains into three categories—health, attitudes, and performance. This tripartite 
categorization enables evaluation across three different measurable domains using 
various tools, such as surveys, performance metrics, disease incidence rates, etc. 
Using the meta-theory of SAM as a framework, my thesis explores the 
relationship among: risk of injury (the stressor), health care (the moderator), and security 
force performance (the strain). If security forces can be strengthened in the performance 
of their duties by the provision of medical support, then efforts to strengthen and build 
partner capacity in the security sector medical system has the potential to directly 
strengthen security and provide an institution that can serve the broader state. 
  
                                                 
33. Ibid., 189. 
34. Ibid., 190. 
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III. THE IMPACT OF CASUALTY/TRAUMA CARE ON 
SECURITY FORCE EFFECTIVENESS: A LARGE-N ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Many factors influence the effectiveness of security forces. While there has been 
significant inquiry and research on the impact of obvious factors (e.g., training, 
leadership, logistics, equipment, oversight, policies, and legal institutions), the influence 
of casualty/trauma care on security force effectiveness has received little attention.35  In 
fact, there is no evidence of any published quantitative or qualitative analysis on how 
casualty/trauma care availability affects the performance of security forces!  If the 
availability of casualty/trauma care to security forces shapes the quality and quantity of 
security, efforts to evaluate and assist the strengthening of medical support must be 
included in any U.S. effort to strengthen the security of other nation-states.   
It is undisputed that the delivery of security, especially in areas with active or 
latent instability, carries an inherent risk of injury for those tasked to provide it. For 
effective and enduring security, security forces must enter and control contested areas to 
establish order, apprehend criminals, and enforce peace. Establishing and maintaining 
security, however, exposes security forces to violence and the risk of injury. For the 
individual soldier or police officer, the risks are personal. For the state, the legitimacy of 
its governance often rests on establishing and maintaining order through the use of 
legitimate coercion and violence. Indeed, security, one of the pillars of development, 
remains a necessary condition for state development and economic progress.  
This chapter explores the relationship between the effectiveness of police forces 
with access to varying levels of casualty/trauma care using a large-n quantitative 
approach, and considers the role of medical support for security forces when building, 
                                                 
35. As defined in the Introduction, “casualty/trauma care” consists of the trauma and rehabilitative care 
provided to security forces in the event of their injury while performing security operations. In this thesis, I 
treat casualty/trauma care as a subset of medical support, which also includes medical care for the diagnosis 
and treatment of non-battle injuries and diseases. Both casualty/trauma care and medical support are 
subsets of health support, which also includes preventive medicine and sanitation services. 
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strengthening, or advising security forces.36  While the data prevents making causal 
claims or quantifying the degree to which casualty/trauma care emboldens a security 
force, a strong association between medical support and improved security force 
effectiveness argues for developing the medical support capacity during any security 
strengthening effort. Furthermore, if the level of violence influences security 
effectiveness (i.e., the role of casualty/trauma care is greater when security forces face 
higher risks), then strengthening the medical support for security forces emerges as a 
critical task during post-conflict stabilization missions.     
What the large-n analysis conducted in this chapter reveals is that security forces 
performed more effectively when there was a reasonable expectation of medical care in 
the event they were injured. The ability of casualty/trauma care to mitigate the risks faced 
by security personnel, however, diminished once it reached a specific level; above this 
level, the risk of injury overwhelmed the benefits from medical care. Additionally, my 
analysis finds that higher quality medical systems were more likely to extend their care to 
security forces using pre-hospital capabilities.37 These findings suggest that 
casualty/trauma care fills a key role in contributing to security force effectiveness and 
that strengthening local medical systems provides an opportunity to improve the medical 
support for security forces, thereby strengthening security. When violence levels are 
particularly high, however, casualty/trauma care cannot mitigate the risks of injury alone, 
but must be provided in concert with other interventions to strengthen security forces.  
B. SOLDIER ADAPTATION MODEL FRAMEWORK 
As introduced in Chapter II, the Soldier Adaptation Model (SAM) described by 
Bliese and Castro provides a framework to understand the factors influencing security 
                                                 
36. By using a large number of cases to test the hypothesis, my thesis takes advantage of an extensive 
dataset to randomize and reduce the impact of omitted variables. While large-n statistical methods provide 
evidence to either accept or reject a hypothesis concerning the relationship between independent and 
dependent variables, they lack the power to explain how the variables are related. Large-n analyses are 
discussed further in Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1997). 
37. Pre-hospital medical capabilities consist of the evaluation, stabilization, and evacuation of patients 
from the place of injury to a medical facility. While it can include care provided by physicians, pre-hospital 
medical care is usually provided by trained individuals, such as medics or paramedics, using specially 
equipped vehicles, such as ambulances. 
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personnel’s work motivation.38 The SAM uses a systems-based approach to describe 
performance outputs (See Figure 1). The primary input, stressors, includes all aspects of 
the environment that “place a load or demand on the soldier.”39 While some of these 
stressors will vary by location and time (e.g., danger), others are omnipresent. As security 
personnel operate in the context of groups and organizations, moderators must be 
cultivated at each level of the institution to be mutually reinforcing and to minimize the 
effects of stressors on performance. Stressors, mitigated by moderators, result in strains, 
analyzed through disease incidence, surveys, and performance metrics.  
Using the SAM framework, my analysis examines the relationship among the risk 
of injury (the stressor), medical support (the moderator), and security force performance 
(the strain).  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION OF LARGE-N ANALYSIS 
Framed in the context of the SAM, the research question for this chapter asks, 
“Are security forces more effective when they anticipate receiving medical care in the 
event they are injured?” In seeking to fully answer this question, several secondary 
questions were addressed. These questions include: 
1. What variable should be used to represent security force effectiveness?  
2. What variable should be used to represent the risk of personal injury to security 
forces? 
3. What variable should be used to represent the provision of medical support for 
security forces? 
4. Are security forces more effective when they have medical support? 
5. Does the level of risk modulate the influence of medical support on security 
force effectiveness? 
6. Is there a relationship between the provision of medical support for security 
forces and the quality of a state’s healthcare system? 
                                                 





The analysis in this chapter limits the term “security forces” to police forces 
focused on internal state security. While military forces are often used to respond to both 
internal and external threats in many states, standardized data on military effectiveness is 
limited. Since all states require police forces to provide internal security a large data set 
exists. Although medical support for military units is often provided through military 
medical networks, police forces usually rely on civilian medical care for their forces, 
especially in areas distant from large urban areas. As Security Force Assistance and 
Foreign Internal Defense both aim to strengthen internal security institutions to foster 
internal security, this chapter assumes its findings will be generalizable to all security 
forces, as the delivery of security involves personal risk by all security personnel.  
E. STUDY DESIGN 
1. Methodology 
The methodology used to answer the research questions involved hypothesis 
testing. Each null hypothesis was tested against available data using a 0.05 level of 
significance. If the hypothesis test failed to meet the level of significance, then I failed to 
reject the null hypothesis. If the null hypothesis was rejected, I accepted the alternate 
hypothesis. When both arms of the hypothesis test contained at least 30 data points, a 
two-sample T-test compared sample means under the assumption that the sample means 
followed a normal data distribution, as suggested by the central limit theorem. If either 
sample arm contained less than 30 data points, normality testing determined whether the 
data followed a normal distribution. If normally distributed, two-sample T-testing was 
used to test the hypothesis. If one of these samples failed to follow a normal distribution, 
non-parametric testing using the Mann-Whitney/Wilcoxon test was used to evaluate for 
significant differences between the samples. Using Minitab 16 Statistical Software to 
conduct statistical computations and generate charts and graphs, documentation of all 
statistical testing is compiled in Appendix A for further reference.  
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2. Variables 
Using the SAM framework to investigate the relationship of casualty/trauma care 
availability on police security force effectiveness, I analyzed police productivity 
(dependent variable/the strain) in regard to the availability of medical support 
(independent variable/the moderator) and risk of injury (independent variable/the 
stressor) faced by security personnel (see Figure 2). While other variables contribute to 
the strains and moderators acting upon the performance of security personnel, these two 
independent variables (medical support and risk of injury) test the role of health support 
on security performance.40  Consequently, for the purpose of my investigation, I focused 
on these two factors to allow comparison among states with otherwise discordant 
features. 
  
Figure 2.   Study variables expressed in SAM system. The risk of injury and the 
presence of a pre-hospital medical system represented the independent 
variables influencing police performance, the dependent variable. 
a. Strain/Outcome: Variable Representing Security Force 
Effectiveness 
Few objective qualitative metrics on security forces and the legal systems 
that support them have been applied globally. For my investigation, police productivity, a 
quantifiable outcome measurement, provided a standardized metric for comparing the 
performance of police forces. While there may be disagreement on the use of police 
productivity as a metric of effectiveness, it appears to be the best metric available, as 
                                                 
40. Within each of these variables, regional and state-specific factors influence the risk of injury and 
provision of healthcare. Future research into these factors could identify targets for intervention and risk 
mitigation. 
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objective qualitative metrics for international security forces remain scarce.41 Speaking 
directly to the challenges of quantifying the quality of security forces, the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime and European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control 
notes that 
[such] an overall assessment would necessarily mean an in-depth look at 
the criminal justice systems of the different countries in theory and 
practice. And even with sufficient knowledge on all criminal justice 
systems of the world it would be a very ambitious task to translate this 
knowledge into a handy performance index, allowing for a ranking of 
countries based on the quality of criminal justice performance.42 
In fact, the metrics used by the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime/European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control do not claim to measure 
quality or “imply that a system with high productivity rates performs better than a system 
with low productivity rates.”43 Nevertheless, the metrics provided in its International 
Statistics on Crime and Justice provide the best available metric linking the willingness 
of security force personnel to make arrests and process the arrests through the legal 
system.   
Police productivity is expressed as the average of three sub-metrics, which 
evaluate security sector productivity: ratio of suspects per police officer, ratio of suspects 
brought before a court per prosecutor, and the ratio of convictions per prosecutor. These 
sub-metrics measure the output of security forces as they expose, investigate and support 
the prosecution of criminals. In accordance with the SAM model, this metric represents a 
                                                 
41. Other security metrics combined non-performance factors (e.g., human rights violations and 
brutality) into their evaluation of security forces. The Failed State Index produced by the Fund for Peace, 
for example, incorporates the influence of corruption, availability of weapons, professionalism and the 
presence of private armies into their metric. The Failed State Index, Conflict Assessment Indicators: The 
Fund for Peace Country Analysis Indicators and Their Measures, Report (Washington, DC: Fund for 
Peace, 2011).  http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/library/cr-10–97-ca-conflictassessmentindicators-
1105c.pdf 
42. Stefan Harrendorf, Markku Heiskanen, and Steven Malby, eds., International Statistics on Crime 
and Justice, report, HEUNI Publication 64 (Helsinki, Finland: Institute for Crime Prevention and Control 
and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010), 132. 
http://www.heuni.fi/Etusivu/Publications/HEUNIreports/1266333832841 
43. Ibid., 121. 
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strain/outcome useful for evaluating the impact of medical support on the productivity of 
security forces.44  
b. The Moderator: Variable to Represent the Provision of Medical 
Support for Security Forces 
The provision of casualty/trauma care to security forces varies 
significantly among nation-states, and there is currently no internationally recognized 
“standard of care” to guide medical support for security institutions. Despite this lack of 
guidance, or perhaps because of it, pre-hospital trauma care has begun to attract the 
attention of the international health community as an important element of essential 
medical services.45    Pre-hospital medical systems (PHMS) connect the community, 
including security personnel, to their medical system by: responding to injuries and 
illnesses outside of the hospital, providing initial resuscitative care, stabilizing for 
transport, and moving the patients to the hospital for definitive care.46  Without a PHMS, 
patients must be brought to the hospital before receiving any medical treatment.47  In 
2007, the World Health Organization (WHO) collected self-reported data from member 
states on the presence of a formal, publicly available pre-hospital care system. This yields 
a metric for the availability of pre-hospital medical care for security services. For those 
states with a PHMS, security force casualties have a reasonable expectation of emergency 
care and transport to the hospital if they are injured while performing their duties. 
Without PHMS, casualties may not be able to access emergency medical care in time to 
preserve their life or prevent permanent disability. While the quality of PHMS varies 
                                                 
44. Although performance metrics represent the best available data for the variable representing police 
behavior, its use limits the power of my study. Definitive conclusions regarding police effectiveness, 
therefore, are to be avoided given the tenuous relationship between performance and effectiveness.  
45. Scott Sasser, Mathew Varghese, Arthur Kellermann, and Jean-Dominique Lormand, Prehospital 
Trauma Care Systems, Report (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2005), 
http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/publications/services/39162_oms_new.pdf. 
46. While military forces often field and maintain medical systems that provide point-of-injury care 
and evacuation services for their forces given the lack of reliable health services in conflict zones, police 
and constabulary services usually rely on the civilian medical system for medical care. 
47. In the absence of a formal PHMS, wounded security personnel must be transported to hospitals or 
clinics using non-standard evacuation platforms, often in the backs of trucks or in civilian vehicles where 
no initial or en route care is provided. Evacuation plans are often ad hoc and not integrated into operational 
plans, which result in poor outcomes and increases morbidity and mortality.  
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widely, and metrics about the quality of the provided care were not available, the 
presence or absence of a PHMS provides a reasonable metric for measuring the provision 
of medical support for security operations. 
c. Stressor: Variable Representing the Risk of Personal Injury to 
Security Forces 
For my analysis, a state’s level of violence represents the risk security 
officers face in the performance of their duties. In areas with higher levels of violence, 
security forces face a higher risk of injury. In areas with lower levels of violence, the risk 
to security personnel is assumed to be less.48    
3. Database  
The majority of the data populating the study’s database was drawn from the 
World Health Organization’s (WHO) data registry and the International Statistics on 
Crime and Justice (ISCJ) report by the United Nations office on Drugs and Crime and the 
European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control (HEUNI).   
The WHO data registry collects and reports public health data for all WHO 
member countries and provides an extensive dataset for analysis.49 All health-related 
information, to include development metrics, economic factors, and disease rates are 
collected longitudinally. In 2008, the WHO published the Global Burden of Disease: 
2004 Update (GBD) and included its data as part of the WHO data registry. As an update 
to data presented in 2002, the GBD summarizes the impact of disease in each of its 192 
member states for 2004. Drawing upon the resources of the WHO and international 
organizations to collect and verify this data, the report presents the data in terms of 
normalized, age-adjusted metrics which also adjust for population distributions, allowing 
                                                 
48. The use of violence as a measure of risk, however, can be confounded by its use as a metric of 
security forces effectiveness, as used in other studies. In the forward of the WHO’s 2002 “World Report on 
Violence and Health,” Nelson Mandela writes, “[violence] thrives in the absence of democracy, respect for 
human rights and good governance.” Alternatively, in my analysis, violence levels reflected the personal 
security risks security forces endured as they endeavored to restore security and stability.  World Report on 
Violence and Health: Summary (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2002). 
http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/summary_en.pdf 
49. “Global Health Observatory Data Repository,” World Health Organization, 
http://apps.who.int/ghodata/, accessed September 8, 2012. 
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for comparison between states. As wounds from conflict and instability consume health 
care resources, the GBD reflects the health impacts of war and violence throughout the 
world in 2004.50 Additional data from the WHO data registry data on health for 2004 was 
extracted to populate the database. When data was not available for 2004, I used data in 
close proximity to 2004. Information about the presence of a formal pre-hospital medical 
system (PHMS), for example, was only available for 2007.   
Published in 2010, the ISCJ report provides key metrics on police, prosecution, 
and detention capacity for UN member states. Information on police density and 
productivity was extracted and added to the database from this dataset. The majority of 
the data reported for individual states covers the years 2004–2006.51 The data for some 
countries, however, falls outside this range or is not listed.   
I further populated my database with open-source documents from the U.S. State 
Department website or the U.S. Embassy website responsible for the country of interest. 
The information from these sites indicates the current presence or absence of a PHMS. In 
these situations, the current information represents the best available data and I included 
it in the database. 
My database excludes states undergoing large armed conflicts during the 2002–
2004 period to remove the bias of skewed figures from wars and post-conflict situations. 
Using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, 
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-
2012, 1946–2011, countries with more than 1,000 deaths/year between 2002 and 2004 
are omitted.52  Countries with low-intensity conflict in 2004 remain in the dataset in 
order to evaluate the impact of increased violence on police performance with different 
levels of medical support. Using these criteria, nine countries were removed from the 
database: Nepal, Colombia, Sudan, Uganda, India, Liberia, Iraq, Russia and Burundi. In 
                                                 
50. The Global Burden of Disease: 2004 Update (Geneva: World Health Organization Press, 2008) 
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/2004_report_update/en/index.html. 
51. Harrendorf, Heiskanen, and Malby, International Statistics on Crime and Justice.  
52.  Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflict, 1946–2011,” UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset, accessed September 8, 2012, 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/. 
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addition, the following three states were excluded due to excessive war-related disability 
and death (greater than 1000 War Age-Standardized Disability Years per 100,000 people 
as reported in the GBD): Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was 
excluded due to a paucity of data. 
 
Table 1.   Summary of Database Information 
Altogether my database includes 179 countries with populations ranging from 
2,000 to 1.3 billion, accounting for 4.9 billion people. Metrics reflecting the quality of the 
PHMS, its penetration into rural areas, and the use of dedicated medical support outside 
of the civilian medical support system remain unavailable. Summary information is 
provided in Table 1. 
Police productivity graphed as a function of violence suggests an inverse 
relationship between the levels of violence and police productivity (See Figure 3). The 
majority of states appear to cluster in the region denoting low levels of violence and low 
to moderate levels of police productivity. For those states with high levels of violence, 
police productivity appears generally low, while states with high levels of police 
productivity have generally low levels of violence. There are no states with high levels of 
violence that also have high levels of police productivity. States without a PHMS appear 
to have lower levels of police productivity and higher levels of violence when compared 
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to states with a PHMS, suggesting that there is a relationship between having medical 
support and police productivity. 
 
Figure 3.  Scatterplot graph of violence levels and police productivity for states 
4. Additional Definitions of Terms and Secondary Variables 
Variables and metrics used in my database include: 
• Age-standardized, Disability-Adjusted Life Year (DALY): The DALY 
computes the burden of a disease process by computing the “…years of 
life lost from premature death and years of life lived in less than full 
health…” as a result of a specific disease.53  While the GBD provides 
DALY in several formats, my study uses the age-standardized metric. The 
age-standardized DALY accounts for rates of disease by age and gender 
according to the WHO World Standard Population.54 This standardization 
allows comparison of states with different population age densities.55 
• Violence (Age-standardized DALYs/100,000 of population): The number 
of DALYs attributed to violence per 100,000 people. 
                                                 
53. Global Burden of Disease, 2. 
54. Ibid., 29. 
55.  Omar B. Ahmad, Cynthia Boschi-Pinto, Alan D. Lopez, Christopher JL Murray, Rafael Lozano, 
and Mie Inoue, Age Standardization of Rates: A New WHO Standard, report, GPE Discussion Paper 31 
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• War (Age-standardized DALYs/100,000 of population): The number of 
DALYs attributed to war per 100,000 people. 
• All-cause Mortality/Morbidity (Age-standardized DALYs/100,000 of 
population): The number of DALYs attributed to all diseases or disease 
processes, to include conflict and violence, experienced by the population 
that affects their health and well-being. 
• Burden of Violence (BOV): Burden of Violence represents the fraction of 
DALYs attributed to violence in relation to the total disease burden (All-
cause Mortality/Morbidity).  
• Under-five mortality rate: In my study, under-five mortality was used as 
an indicator of the quality and development of the civilian medical sector 
providing PHMS service. The under-five mortality rate represents the 
probability of dying by age 5 per 1,000 live births. Commonly used as a 
metric for the effectiveness of a state’s health system, factors influencing 
its value include:  the supply of health and nutrition services, food 
security, feeding practices, levels of hygiene and sanitation, access to safe 
water, female illiteracy, early pregnancy, access to health services, and 
gender equity. As an outcome metric, the under-five mortality provides 
feedback on how well a state’s health system operates in general and in 
coordination with other ministries.56  
• Population (1,000’s): The population metric represents the de facto 
population of each state. The WHO calculates population data from the 
most recent “World Population Prospects” report produced by the United 
Nations Population Division. Data was extracted for the 2004 time 
period.57 
F. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
1. Medical Support’s Impact on Security Force Productivity 
To investigate whether security forces are more effective when they have 
casualty/trauma care available, the following hypotheses were generated: 
H0: Security force productivity is not associated with the availability of 
casualty/trauma care. 
 
Ha: Security forces are more productive when casualty/trauma care is readily 
available. 
                                                 
56. The State of the World’s Children: 2008, Report (New York, NY: United Nations Children Fund 
(UNICEF), December 2007), http://www.unicef.org/sowc08/docs/sowc08.pdf. 
57. World Population Prospects: 2004 Revision (New York, NY: United Nations, 2005), 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/WPP2004/wpp2004.htm. 
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Using a one-tailed T-test to compare the productivity of security forces both with 
and without a PHMS, analysis of the database reveals a significant difference in the 
productivity of security forces in states with a PHMS, leading to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis and acceptance of the alternate hypothesis (p=0.000) (see Appendix A, 
paragraph A). This finding supports the claim that medical support is associated with the 
productivity of security forces. While this finding cannot claim, nor is it proposed, that 
availability of casualty/trauma care caused higher levels of police productivity, the strong 
association, especially when viewed through the SAM framework, suggests that those 
security forces with a PHMS are more likely to be more productive. Alternatively, those 
without a PHMS tend to be less productive.   
In the context of security building and stability operations, any effort to 
strengthen the internal security forces of another nation-state must include an assessment 
of the casualty/trauma care provided to security forces and include efforts to strengthen it 
as part of a comprehensive plan to strengthen all levels of security. These efforts could 
include developing programs to train security forces on basic first aid, developing 
indigenous ambulance systems with en route care, training physicians at local clinics in 
trauma care and resuscitation, and strengthening surgical capabilities.   
In Pre-hospital Trauma Care Systems, the WHO advocates for the development 
of pre-hospital trauma care and proposes essential and desired components needed for an 
effective system.58  It strongly promotes the development of locally sustainable systems 
and prescribes a tiered approach to pre-hospital care that is tailored to the needs of the 
community served by the medical system. In the companion document, Guidelines for 
Essential Trauma Care, the WHO recommends specific essential capabilities that 
medical systems should develop to care for trauma patients.59  Evidence of the need to 
further develop trauma care capabilities in rural/less developed areas is provided by 
Mock, et al. Their study demonstrates significantly higher trauma mortality rates in rural 
areas of low-income countries: 6% mortality rates from trauma in high-income countries 
                                                 
58. Sasser, Varghese, Kellermann, and Lormand, Prehospital Trauma Care Systems. 
59. World Health Organization, Guidelines for Essential Trauma Care (Geneva: World Health 
Organization, 2004), http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2004/9241546409.pdf. 
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compared to 36% mortality rates from trauma in rural areas of low-income countries.60 A 
recent meta-analysis by Henry and Reingold evaluating the efficacy of programs 
designed to develop trauma systems in developing countries pools the results of 14 
studies and finds a 25% reduction in mortality after implementing trauma systems. 
Improvement in rural mortality was even more pronounced.61  
As state legitimacy and security are often most threatened in rural areas, 
American efforts to strengthen the internal security forces of partner nation-states must 
include the nurturing and development of indigenous trauma systems to support the 
delivery of security. 
2.  Level of Risk 
To investigate whether the level of risk faced by security forces modulates the 
influence of medical support on security force effectiveness, the following hypotheses 
were generated: 
H0: The level of risk facing security forces does not impact the association 
between higher productivity in states with a PHMS. 
 
HA: The level of risk facing a security force does impact the association 
between higher productivity in states with a PHMS. 
In my analysis, I evaluated the impact of medical support in terms of its ability to 
influence security personnel behavior. In other words, when violence levels are low, the 
benefits of health support might not be fully appreciated, and may not have an impact on 
subsequent behavior. In contrast, the utility and impact of health support might directly 
impact security force behavior in areas of higher violence. Additionally, the findings 
suggest that there might be a level of violence that can no longer be mitigated by health 
support. If true, other interventions, in addition to health support, are required to ensure 
the effective conduct of security operations in those regions with high levels of 
risk/violence. 
                                                 
60. Charles Mock, “Trauma outcomes in the rural developing world: comparison with an urban level I 
trauma center,” The Journal of Trauma 35 (1993): 518–523. 
61. Jaymie Ang Henry and Arthur Lawrence Reingold, “Prehospital trauma systems reduce mortality 
in developing countries: a systematic review and meta-analysis,” Journal of Trauma and Acute Care 
Surgery 73, no. 1 (July 2012): 261–8. 
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In the first test of these hypotheses, I compared the violence levels between states 
with police productivity data and found a significant difference between the levels of risk 
based on the availability of a PHMS (p=0.025)( see Appendix A, paragraph B). This 
finding, therefore, rejected the null hypothesis and accepted the alternative hypothesis 
that there is an association between the risks police forces face and the presence of a 
PHMS. In fact, having a PHMS was associated with countries with lower levels of risk. 
This suggests that countries with higher levels of risk are less likely to have a PHMS to 
support security forces. 
In the second test of these hypotheses, I investigated whether a certain level of 
violence or risk severed the link between police productivity and the presence of a 
PHMS. Evaluating risk of violence as a percentage of the total disease burden of the 
country quantifies the risk to security personnel relative to other causes of death and 
disease. By dividing the DALY for violence by the DALY for All-cause 
Mortality/Morbidity (total disease burden), a Burden of Violence (BOV) was determined 
for each country. My analysis reveals that up to a BOV of 2.25%, police productivity 
continued to be significantly better with medical support (p=0.002) (see Appendix A, 
paragraph C). This finding rejected the null hypothesis and led me to accept the 
alternative hypothesis. However, once the level of risk increased above 2.25% BOV, the 
presence of medical support failed to improve the productivity of security forces 
(p=0.9512) (see Appendix A, paragraph D). This result, therefore, failed to reject the null 
hypothesis. Once the BOV exceeded 2.25%, the association between higher police 
productivity with a PHMS vanished. 
These findings suggest that medical support significantly improves the 
productivity of security forces up to a certain level. Two likely causes of this ceiling 
effect are increased perceived risk by the security forces and the willingness of PHMS 
personnel to operate in areas of increased risk. Because the moderating effect of a PHMS 
appears to diminish once security personnel perceive the risk of injury as greater than the 
benefits of providing security, security forces need to enhance other moderators (e.g., 
send a larger force, provide better armor, and improve training) to counteract this change 
in productivity. Similarly, if the risk of violence also influences the reliability of the 
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PHMS, ambulance personnel must be willing to operate in areas of violence. If medical 
first responders are unwilling to enter areas of increased risk, medical support for security 
forces will be unavailable. One conclusion that can be drawn is that without the 
expectation of medical support, security forces are likely to modify their security 
productivity. Dedicated medical support units, tactically trained and with resources to 
augment security personnel in regions with high levels of risk, would help fulfill these 
expectations. 
3. PHMS as a Reflection of Medical System Quality 
Once a PHMS appeared to be associated with better police productivity and lower 
levels of risk/violence, I turned to other factors influencing the provision of PHMS. 
Because the PHMS extends the care provided by the local health systems, the quality of 
the health systems might be expected to influence whether a PHMS capability exists. To 
explore the association between medical system quality and PHMS availability, the 
following hypotheses were generated: 
H0: The quality level of the medical system had no impact on the availability 
of a PHMS capability to support security operations. 
 
HA: Higher quality medical systems were more likely to field a PHMS to 
support security operations. 
Because the under-five mortality rates are a recognized outcome metric for health 
care quality, they enable me to make a comparison between health systems against an 
international standard. Using a one-tailed T-test, the under-five mortality rates of 
countries with and without a PHMS proved significantly different (p=0.000) (see 
Appendix A, paragraph E). Those states with a PHMS had significantly lower under-five 
mortality rates. This finding suggests a connection between the quality of the health 
system and the provision of PHMS.  
While this finding appears intuitive, it highlights the need to evaluate and 
strengthen the civilian and security force medical systems providing medical support.    
Efforts to improve civilian institutions by focusing on aspects related to trauma care 
would prioritize medical strengthening engagements that directly impact security. While 
there have been calls from the international community for military forces to focus on 
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security while development organizations focus on development, my findings point to the 
need to develop medical support capabilities in the civilian medical sector as a key 
component of overall security strengthening efforts.62  
4. Limitations 
Because my analysis relied on data collected for other studies or research efforts, 
the scope and the strength of its conclusions are bounded. As a large-n study, the study’s 
descriptive power to demonstrate the relationship among risks, medical support and 
security productivity is, by definition, retrospective. While the data allows some 
discussion of an investigation into issues of quality, quality is not specifically measured 
or quantified other than in relation to quality metrics of the health systems. The lack of an 
international standard for police effectiveness represents a major limitation to 
investigating this topic. While police productivity is used as a representative factor for 
police force behavior, the potential gap between productivity and effectiveness prevents a 
more directed analysis. Another major limitation stems from the paucity of qualitative 
and quantitative metrics on the quality, reliability, and capabilities of each state’s PHMS. 
While the concept of PHMS quality is explored in regard to providing reliable support to 
security forces, the binominal nature of the PHMS data restricts further analysis. Future 
efforts to establish both quantitative and qualitative measures of medical support for 
security operations would facilitate a more robust analysis and identify the key features a 
PHMS needs in order to strengthen security forces.  
                                                 
62. Dr. Adams’s comments summarize the common arguments against military involvement in 
development activities by claiming that they do more harm than good. Gordon Adams, “We ask too much 
of the military,” Foreign Affairs, October 29, 2012, 
http://adams.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/29/we_ask_too_much_of_the_military. The WHO’s 
InterAgency Standing Committee for the Global Health cluster, a group representing 30 international health 
organizations, also addresses the criticisms and problems associated with military forces engaging in health 






Based on the analysis conducted in this chapter, the following recommendations should 
be incorporated into U.S. efforts to strengthen partner nation-state security forces: 
1. States should capitalize on the association between police productivity and the 
provision of casualty/trauma care in order to strengthen security. Because of the 
significant overlap in providing trauma care for military and civilian injuries, 
efforts to strengthen the medical sector’s support of security personnel will have 
spillover effects to the civilian population, thereby increasing the dividend on the 
investment.  
2. For operations in areas of high risk, security forces should have dedicated 
casualty/trauma care provided by personnel trained to operate with the security 
forces and equipped with appropriate equipment. This capability will ensure the 
provision of medical support when its need is likely the greatest. 
3. Medical engagements by the U.S. to strengthen partner states must include 
development of the partner state’s medical support system as a critical pillar of 
security development. These engagements should extend to the civilian medical 
system if security forces rely on them to provide casualty/trauma care, especially 
in rural areas. All medical engagements must be designed to build partner 
capacity and be focused on interventions that develop, support, or strengthen the 
medical support system for security forces. By viewing all actions through the 
lens of security, medical engagements would be limited to those activities that 
support security building. 
4. Standardized metrics for the effectiveness of security forces, PHMS, and 
trauma care systems should be developed in order to provide feedback on 
interventions designed to improve these institutions and facilitate further research 
and informed policy. 
H. CONCLUSIONS 
Casualty/trauma care for security forces plays a key role in strengthening the 
effectiveness of security operations. By mitigating the stressor of potential injury, 
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casualty/trauma care encourages security productivity, a key component of effectiveness. 
These benefits, however, appear to plateau once the risk of injury exceeds a threshold 
above which security personnel are overwhelmed by risk or where the environment 
precludes effective and reliable medical support. As the U.S. seeks to strengthen the 
security forces of its partner nation-states, special emphasis and resourcing of medical 
support for those forces is essential. When training internal security forces, all health or 
medical development endeavors must target interventions that strengthen civilian first 


















IV. MEDICAL SUPPORT AND THE WILL TO FIGHT: A GAME 
THEORY ANALYSIS 
Give all the care you possibly can to your wounded, for if you neglect 
them, you will make your soldiers timorous and cowardly before a battle, 
and, not only that, but your personnel, whom you might preserve and 
retain by proper consideration for their health and welfare, will be 
otherwise lost to you through your own negligence. 
–Byzantine Emperor Leo (886–912)63 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 3, the retrospective large-n analysis of the link between security force 
effectiveness and the provision of medical support established that members of security 
forces are more likely to be productive when they have a reasonable expectation of 
medical care in the event they are injured. This chapter explores the “why” of the 
relationship between security force performance and the availability of casualty/trauma 
care.  
What does it take to establish security? There is little disagreement in the field of 
security studies that a legitimate government must maintain a monopoly on the coercive 
use of force within its borders and abroad.64  How that force is used and who it serves 
speaks directly to the state’s viability and its acceptance by the population. The proper 
use of force, usually within the context of a legal system that prevents abuse or 
unrestrained control, supports the legitimacy of a nation-state. Citizens abdicate their use 
of force to the state with the expectation of peace and security, and the state assumes the 
responsibility to fulfill that expectation. Without security, progress, growth, and 
development fail. When the peace is broken, either by those contesting the rule of law or 
in pursuit of criminal activities, the state must re-establish its primacy through the use of 
security forces and the judicial system; this often requires the use of violence. In order for 
                                                 
63. As cited in Fielding H. Garrison, Notes on the History of Military Medicine (New York: Georg 
Olms Verlag, 1922), 80, http://archive.org/details/notesonhistoryof00garr. 
64. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated by H.H. 
Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78. 
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violence to be effective, however, the security forces must be willing to fight against 
those threatening the state. At the most basic level, security forces must be willing to put 
their lives at risk to serve the state’s interests.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION FOR GAME THEORY ANALYSIS 
This chapter explores the same research question addressed in Chapter 3 from a 
different perspective, through the lens of game theory.65  The research question for this 
chapter therefore asks, “Are security forces more effective when they anticipate receiving 
medical care in the event they are injured?”  In seeking to fully answer this question 
using game theory, several secondary questions were addressed. These questions include: 
1. How does game theory assist in exploring the research question? 
2. What “game” is explored to understand the link between health support and 
security force effectiveness and performance? 
3. What variable should be used to represent the provision of medical support? 
4. What variable should be used to represent security force effectiveness? 
5. Does the level of risk faced by security forces influence their willingness to 
fight? 
6. Does medical support mitigate the level of risks faced by security forces and 
influence their willingness to fight? 
                                                 
65. Essentially creating a new branch of mathematics in 1944, John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior and provided a framework to model 
contests between players. Game theory explores the rational behavior of contestants when each player’s 
best choice, or behavior, is contingent on the choice of his opponent. While initially .”..hailed by some as a 
creation as important to the theoretical development of the social sciences as the calculus had been to the 
development of classical mechanics and physics...,” game theory has not been widely applied across the 
social sciences. It has, however, significantly influenced work in economics, political science, international 
relations, .”..arms control and disarmament policies, international negotiation and bargaining processes, and 
so forth.” At its core, game theory models the behavior, strategies, and outcomes of contestants when they 
have different motives, goals, or outcomes. This chapter applies the principles and theories of game theory 
to explore, ceteris paribus, the influence of health support on the behavior of security forces and the 
willingness of members of security forces to put themselves in harm’s way given varying levels of risk. 
While the foundations of game theory are grounded in complex mathematics, its principles allow a robust 
and logical approach to model and explore complex human interactions.   Additionally, game theory 
analysis elucidates the strategies each player could implement to influence his opponent’s behavior. Steven 
J. Brams, Game Theory and Politic (London: The Free Press, 1975), xi and 1. 
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C. ASSUMPTIONS 
The heart of game theory assumes that contestants display rational behavior. As 
described by Dahl and Lindblom, “[an] action is rational to the extent that it is ‘correctly’ 
designed to maximize goal achievement, given the goal in question and the real world as 
it exists.”66  Rational action, however, should not be confused with calculated action. 
While some, such as economist Anthony Downs, suggest rational behavior seeks 
“maximizing output for a given input, or minimizing input for a given output,” Dahl and 
Lindbolm suggest a definition of rationality that includes dispositional factors.67  They 
write 
[a] satisfying emotional life seems to require opportunity for 
impulsiveness, spontaneity, the direct expression of “animal spirits” (the 
human spirit, some might say), risk taking without calculation of the 
consequences, joy, fun, anger. The most rational act is not necessarily the 
most carefully calculated one.68 
The concept of rationality, therefore, supports an intentional approach to decision-
making that includes the motives behind the behavior. This view, discussed by Isaak, 
suggests that conscious acts are influenced by dispositional factors that include the 
unconscious.69  Akerlof and Kranton further refine the interaction between intentional 
behavior and unconscious factors by introducing the concept of identity, or a person’s 
concept of self, to understand behaviors that appear otherwise irrational (i.e., suicide 
bombers).70  In short, an individual’s identity provides the context, both conscious and 
unconscious, and boundaries for decision-making.71  Adapting this approach, my thesis 
assumes that both the state and soldiers behave rationally in the context of their identities, 
                                                 
66. Robert I. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1953), 38. 
67. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 5. 
68. Dahl and Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare, 40. 
69. Alan Isaak, Scope and Methods of Political Science: An Introduction to the Methodology of 
Political Inquiry (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1981).  
70. George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, “Economics and Identify,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 116, no. 3 (August 2000): 715–753. 
71. This concept is explained more fully in George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, Identity 
Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2010). 
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often a complex amalgamation of history, priorities, and motives. Predicting the 
behaviors of others, especially those from a significantly different culture, assumes a 
deep understanding of each participant’s identity. My analysis similarly assumes a 
complete appreciation of the identities and motives of the players involved in the 
explored games. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter uses game theory to explore the preferences and behaviors of a state 
and the personnel charged to provide security according to varying levels of risk. After 
defining the game between the two players—the state and security personnel—games are 
constructed for two possible scenarios: a high-security environment and a low-security 
environment. The risk of injury to security personnel in a high-security environment is 
relatively low, while, in contrast, low-security environments present a greater risk to 
security personnel. For each of these games, players’ preferences will initially be 
represented by ordinal values in order to explore the likely outcomes and strategic moves 
available to each contestant. Following this analysis, I will use Utility Theory to calculate 
cardinal values for the game outcomes in order to further investigate the strength of the 
preferences and the role of risk in influencing behavior. Medical support for Afghan 
National Security Forces offers a contemporary example to illuminate the findings of my 
analysis.  
E. DEFINING THE GAME 
1. The Dilemma 
States desire capable, reliable, and controlled security forces to dispense violence 
in a controlled manner, targeting only those who break the law. “The size of the defense 
budget serves to identify the relative importance of the coercive arm in comparison to 
other organs of state, and it conveys a general sense of the size of the military 
establishment in absolute terms.”72  Fielding a force with restraint and finesse requires a 
                                                 
72. Ashley J. Tellis, Janice Bially, Christopher Layne, and Melissa McPherson, “Measuring Military 
Capability,” in Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age (Arroyo: RAND Corporation, 2000), 
136, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1110.html. 
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significant investment in personnel, equipment, and training. For developing or emerging 
states, the cost of this force can easily outstrip the state’s ability to pay for it.73 The 
consequences of not fielding a security force, however, can be devastating to state 
security and impede economic growth.74  Worse yet, fielding a force on the cheap may 
lead to extractive behaviors by the security forces and threaten state legitimacy. 
Similarly, developing and maintaining a health care system can be quite expensive. The 
technical expertise, equipment, and infrastructure needed to provide comprehensive 
healthcare can quickly overwhelm a developing country.  
The dilemma for the state, therefore, is to ensure that the security forces have the 
resources and support they need to conduct their security operations in a sustainable 
manner. Viewing this dilemma through the lens of game theory informs the role of 
casualty/trauma care for the state’s security forces and the risks associated with its 
absence. 
2. Framing the Game 
My analysis considers a theoretical, generic developing or emerging state with 
areas of violence within its borders. While the state receives outside funding and aid to 
establish and improve government services, funding is limited. The state must allocate its 
support to meet its many requirements. Allocating additional funding to provide 
casualty/trauma support to security forces would require decreasing funding to other 
areas of governance and development. For the cessation of conflict and continued growth, 
however, the state must establish security within its borders, especially in the rural areas 
where its control remains tenuous.  
                                                 
73. In Afghanistan, for example, NATO estimates that Afghanistan will not be able to support the cost 
of its security forces until 2040 or later. Found in NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Preparing the Afghan 
National Security Forces for Transition, Committee Report, 211 DSC 10 E bis, 2010,  http://www.nato-
pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2084. 
74. United Nations, “A More Secure World: Our shared responsibility,” Report of the Secretary 
General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, New York, December 2, 2004, 
http://www.un.org/secureworld/report., United Nations, “In Larger Freedom: Towards development, 
security and human rights for all,” Report of the Secretary-General, New York, March 21, 2005, 
http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm, and Daniel Trachsler, “Security and Development: 
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a. Variable to represent the provision of medical support 
Casualty/trauma care includes initial treatment, evacuation, and definitive 
care of injuries sustained in the enforcement of security duties. While the role of health 
and medical support to prevent and treat communicable and non-battle injuries is well 
documented and an important component of medical support, this chapter restricts 
medical support to the provision of casualty/trauma care.75   Casualty/trauma care, by its 
technical nature, is expensive and difficult to provide. While easier to implement in larger 
cities with shorter evacuation distances and a larger concentration of security forces, 
providing casualty/trauma care to rural areas is difficult and less efficient. The demand 
for casualty/trauma care, however, is based on the level of security where the soldiers are 
operating. As the risk of injury increases, the probability of needing casualty/trauma 
support increases. In my game, states decide whether they will make the investments, 
such as in infrastructure and human capital, necessary to field and maintain a medical 
casualty/trauma system that reliably provides support to security personnel.  
b. Variable to represent security force effectiveness 
Soldier preferences to provide security vary based on the perceived risks 
and benefits. The possibility of death or injury poses the principal risk. Factors such as 
professionalism, leadership, legitimacy of their cause, unit cohesion, doctrine, training, 
organization, and camaraderie contribute to the effectiveness of a security unit.76  In 
terms of the individual benefits gained by being a member of a security force, 
employment, monetary remuneration, prestige, and personal pride are commonly cited.77 
When faced with the decision to place themselves at risk while conducting security 
missions, members individually weigh the risks and benefits of fighting within the 
                                                 
75. Many resources document the importance of Medical care to military forces to prevent diseases, 
treat non-battle injuries and illness, and preserve the fighting strength. Non-battle injures result in more 
losses of combat soldiers than fighting, and the impact of medical support to sustain these forces is 
unquestionable. The impact of communicable diseases on fighting forces in World War I, for example, is 
documented in U.S. Army Medical Department, Preventive Medicine in WWII, Volume IV, Communicable 
Diseases, Transmitted Chiefly Through Respiratory and Alimentary Tract, editor, ed. Colonel John Boyd 
Coates, Jr (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, Office of the Surgeon General, 1958), 
http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/wwii/PM4/default.htm.    
76. Tellis, Bially, Layne, and McPherson, “Measuring Military Capability.”  
77. Galantino, “Work Motivation and the Peacekeeper.” 
 45 
context of their identity and personal narrative. Members of security forces must decide 
whether they are willing to face the risk of injury as they work to improve or maintain 
security. Alternatively, members of security forces could, while appearing to be 
conscientious, reduce their risk of injury by conducting operations that would have no 
real impact on security. For my game, soldiers, both individually and collectively, must 
decide whether they will either conduct effective security operations or shun them. 
Avoidance of effective security operations consists of either refusing to participate in 
security operations by avoiding service, or conducting operations that have no substantial 
impact on security. For the remainder of this chapter, the terms soldier, soldiers, security 
force, and security personnel are used interchangeably to represent both the decisions of 
individuals in the security forces and the organization, as a whole. 
3. The Games 
The game used to analyze the interaction between the security force’s willingness 
to provide security and the state’s provision of health care is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  Soldiers versus the state. In this game matrix, the four potential outcomes are 
designated by the intersection of each player’s options. 
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In this game, there are four potential outcomes created by the intersection of the 
two players’ choices/behaviors: 
AC – The soldiers provide security, and the state provides health support. 
AD – The soldiers provide security, and the state does not provide health support. 
BC – The soldiers do not provide security, and the state provides health support. 
BD – The soldiers do not provide security, and the state does not provide health 
support. 
With the possible outcomes defined, players’ preferences for the outcomes are rank 
ordered from best to worst using an ordinal scale: the higher the number, the greater the 
preference. Four represents the best outcome and one represents the worst outcome. Once 
determined, the preferences are placed into the game matrix for analysis of likely 
outcomes and the strategic moves available to each player to influence the outcomes.  
F. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF GAMES WITH ORDINAL VALUES 
1. Game 1: High-Security Environment, Low-Risk of Injury  
a. Preferences for Game 1: High-Security Environment, Low-Risk 
of Injury  
(1) Soldier Preferences in Low-Risk Environment. In a high 
security environment where the perceived risks of injury are low or negligible, the 
benefits of prestige, pride, and employment outweigh the health risks. In this situation, 
soldiers will favor aggressive performance of their duties independent of the provision of 
medical support. For those outcomes that do not include security forces providing 
security, soldiers favor having health support in the event they are attacked by opposing 
forces even though they are not actively performing security operations (e.g., a mortar 
attack on their base). See Appendix B, paragraph B for a chart listing the soldiers’ ordinal 
preferences.  
(2) State Preference in a Low-Risk Environment.  The state 
highly favors the establishment and maintenance of a high-security environment. The 
cost of providing medical support, however, could be onerous and the state prefers, from 
an economic perspective, to minimize this cost when possible. If soldiers were willing to 
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fight without medical support, the state could use its resources for other activities, but its 
next best option would be to provide medical support rather than be left without security. 
The state, however, does not want to provide health support to a security force that will 
not provide security. See Appendix B, paragraph C for a chart listing the state’s ordinal 
preferences.  
b. Game 1: Soldier versus State in Low-Risk Environment 
With relative preferences for the outcomes established, the game matrix is 
populated and player preferences are illustrated in Figure 5. 
GAME 1:  SOLDIERS VERSUS STATE IN LOW RISK ENVIRONMENT 
   
State 
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B (2,1)  (1,2) 
      
Figure 5.  Soldiers versus the state with high-security environment/low-risk of injury to 
soldier. In this game, each player has a dominant strategy (for soldiers to 
provide security and for the state to NOT provide health support) that is 
independent of the other player’s choice. As illustrated by the flow diagram, 
outcome AD is a Nash equilibrium as no arrows depart this outcome. Nash 
equilibriums are points where neither player can benefit from deviating 
unilaterally.78 
The game matrix illustrated in Figure 6 clearly defines the game and 
relative ordinal preference for each outcome. Flow arrows illustrate each player’s 
behavior based on his preferences and the behavior of his opponent. From the flow 
                                                 
78. Phillip D. Strafin, Game Theory and Strategy (Washington, DC: The Mathematical Association of 
America, 1993), 66. 
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diagram, it is clear that each player has a dominant strategy when he acts conservatively 
(maximizing his minimum outcomes for each choice). The intersection of these dominant 
strategies leads to a likely outcome of AD: the soldiers provide security, but the state 
does not provide health support. This outcome is the best preference for the state and the 
next best preference for the soldiers. Because neither player can increase his preference 
by moving unilaterally, this outcome is a Nash equilibrium and a highly stable outcome 
which is resistant to change.79   
c. Game 1 Strategic Moves 
While players can secure the likely outcome of AD by acting first, neither 
player can improve his position by moving first. It is clear that without communication 
between the players, soldiers will elect to provide security and the state will choose to 
spend its budget in other areas.  
With communication between the players, however, additional strategic 
moves are available. Unfortunately for the state, the soldiers have the only viable 
strategic move in this game. If they are willing to risk the possible consequences and can 
make a credible threat, the soldiers have the ability to threaten to stop providing security 
unless the state provides medical support. If the state does not meet this demand and the 
soldiers make good on their threat, the result of the game is BD: soldiers do not provide 
security, and the state does not provide health support. The outcome of BD hurts both the 
soldiers and the state; it is the worst outcome for the soldiers and the least best outcome 
for the state. If this threat is credible and believed, the threat removes the outcome AD 
from the game and forces the state to provide health support in order to get AC, its next 
best outcome: soldiers provide security and the state provides health support. 
The availability of this strategic move creates a dilemma for the state. 
Does it accept the cost of providing health support, its next best outcome, in order to 
guarantee the delivery of security and preempt this threat? Alternatives to giving in to the 
threat, such as disciplining those who make the threat, may be available to the state but 
                                                 
79. Ibid. 
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may weaken the state’s legitimacy by highlighting its unwillingness to provide for its 
security forces.   
2. Game 2: Low-Security Environment, High-Risk of Injury  
a. Preferences for Game 2: Low-Security Environment, High-Risk 
of Injury 
(1) Soldier Preferences in a High-Risk Environment. In Game 
2, soldiers enter an area of operations with poor security and active opponents. With an 
increase in the risk of injury, the soldiers change their preferred order of possible 
outcomes. Despite an increased perceived risk of injury, the soldiers still prefer to 
provide security so long as there is provision of medical support. The benefits of prestige, 
employment, and professionalism outweigh the risks of injury in the event someone 
becomes a casualty. This preference is consistent with the observed behavior of modern 
police and military forces throughout the world. Without the provision of medical 
support, however, soldiers reassign their preference to provide security to their worst 
option. This reordering is consistent with behaviors of even the most elite U.S. military 
forces. When aerial medevac becomes unavailable due to poor weather, for example, 
U.S. forces often modify or cancel combat operations to decrease the risk of injury. See 
Appendix B, paragraph D for a chart listing the soldiers’ ordinal preferences.  
(2) State Preferences in High-Risk Environment. With a 
change in security level, however, the state does not modify its preferences between the 
possible outcomes. The state’s primary desire for the establishment of security remains 
paramount, but the state would prefer this outcome at the lowest possible economic cost. 
While it may be willing to invest in medical support should this be required to induce the 
soldiers to provide security, it would prefer soldiers to provide security without it. As in 
the first game, the state considers providing medical support to soldiers unwilling to 
provide security as its worst outcome. See Appendix B, paragraph C for a chart listing the 
state’s ordinal preferences.  
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b. Game 2: Soldier versus State in High-Risk Environment 
With the new soldier preferences established, the game matrix for Game 2 
is illustrated in Figure 6. 
  GAME 2:  SOLDIERS VERSUS STATE IN HIGH RISK ENVIRONMENT 
   
State 
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Figure 6.  Soldiers versus the state with low security environment/high risk of injury to 
soldier. With the change in soldier preferences given the higher risk of injury, 
the soldiers’ preference becomes contingent upon the provision of medical 
care. The likely outcome moves to BD and, as the flow diagram illustrates, 
establishes a new Nash equilibrium. With an increased level of risk to the 
soldiers, the most likely outcome is the least best option for both players. 
With the increased risk of injury to the soldiers, the game has changed 
significantly. While the state still has a dominant strategy to avoid providing health 
support, the soldiers’ choice to provide security is based upon the actions of the state. 
When the state provides health support, the soldiers will provide security. When the state 
fails to provide health support, the soldiers do not provide security.  
As in the first game without communication, the interaction between both 
players’ preferences leads to the likely outcome of BD in pure strategies. The outcome 
BD, however, is the least best option for both players. With neither player having the 
ability to increase his preference unilaterally, the outcome BD is a Nash equilibrium and 
a stable outcome. 
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c. Game 2 Strategic Moves 
Strategic moves in this game favor the state. While the soldiers can play 
first to secure the expected outcome of AD, the state has the ability to improve its 
outcome to its second best preference by providing healthcare first. This first move by the 
state would result in the outcome AC: soldiers provide security and the state provides 
health support. This outcome, which is the best preference for the soldiers, shows soldiers 
the potential benefit in waiting and letting the state make the first move in the hopes that 
the state will identify and take advantage of its first move opportunity. 
By communicating with the soldiers, the state also can make a strategic 
promise. By promising to provide health support for those injured while performing their 
duties, the state can remove the lack of health support as a factor (i.e., the promise 
removes outcome AD). This change in the game results in AC: soldiers provide security 
and the state provides health support, the soldiers’ best outcome and the state’s second 
best outcome.   
3. Summary of Games and Strategic Moves 
These games clearly demonstrate the importance of providing medical support to 
soldiers and security personnel as the risk of injury increases. Because the establishment 
and maintenance of security requires soldiers to fight and risk injury when confronted by 
an opposing force, health support influences the provision of security when the 
opposition is credible and capable. Using ordinal values, the analysis predicts the 
following: 
 When the risk of injury is low: 
• soldiers will provide security, even if the state does not provide health 
support, 
• the expected outcome is a Nash equilibrium and is stable,  
• each player has a first move advantage to secure the likely outcome, and  
• soldiers can pose a valid strategic threat by stopping security operations 
unless the state provides health support. 
When the risk of injury increases significantly: 
• soldiers will only provide security when the state provides health support, 
• the expected outcome is a Nash equilibrium and is stable, 
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• the state can improve its outcome by executing a first move and providing 
health support, resulting in the soldiers providing security, and 
• the state has an incentive to make a strategic promise to provide health 
care if the soldiers conduct security operations. 
G. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF GAMES WITH CARDINAL VALUES 
1. Cardinal Scaling  
The first two games use ordinal values to compare the various outcomes available 
to the state and soldiers. While ordinal ranking allows the model to explore the actions of 
the players, the use of cardinal values to represent relative utility provides additional 
insight into the strength of strategic moves and the benefit or costs of various outcomes.  
Cardinal values and interval scaling are being used to provide a qualitative 
assessment of the players’ behaviors and the relative importance of health support on 
security development and operations. Historical data are used for stochastic variables in 
the analysis and are drawn from mortality data in El Salvador before and after a U.S. 
intervention to improve medical support to security forces.80 The interval scaling used in 
my analysis is illustrative and designed to reflect generally accepted behaviors and 
preferences by the state and security forces. Quantitative extrapolation to specific 
situations, however, would require investigation of the specific values of the state and 
security forces to develop accurate interval scaling. 
2. Cardinal Values for State Preferences 
The cardinal values representing the utility of the four outcomes to the state are 
based on the need and purpose of the security forces. The state has a great interest in the 
establishment of security and is willing to invest funding for the establishment and 
resourcing of security forces in order to set the conditions for economic growth and 
peace. In general, the perceived benefits of having security greatly outweigh the cost of 
                                                 
80. The Salvadoran military experienced significant attrition, low morale and decreased performance 
in its forces as their mortality rate exceeded 45%. A U.S. Mobile Training Team was sent to El Salvador in 
1983 to emphasize combat-related medical care. As a result of the team’s efforts training and equipping the 
Salvadoran military medical support system, mortality rates for those wounded in action dropped to 5% in 
approximately 18 months. Russ Zajtchuk, F. William Brown, and James H. Rumbaugh, “Medical Success 
in El Salvador,” Military Medicine 154 (1989): 59–61. 
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allocating funds to health support in order to create the conditions for stability and 
economic growth. The relationship among the different outcomes is illustrated in Figure 
7. Further references concerning the computation of the state’s utility values are included 
in Appendix B, paragraph E. 
 
Figure 7.  Interval scaling of cardinal utilities for state outcomes. The relative value of 
each outcome is graphed on the interval scale between zero and 100. The 
graph demonstrates a definite preference by the state to have outcomes that 
involve the provision of security (AC and AD). 
3. Cardinal Values for Soldiers’ Preferences 
The interval scaling for soldiers’ preferences was developed using decision 
analysis to calculate the expected value of various outcomes. Decision analysis provides 
the ability to include stochastic phenomena in order to investigate the impact of variables 
on the expected value of different outcomes. By “…[calculating] the expected utility of 
each course of action and [considering] the strategy that yields the largest expected 
utility,” we are able to explore how changes in the risk of injury change soldiers’ 
preferences.81 In developing the utilities for various outcomes, decision analysis assists in 
determining the various expected values of different outcomes as the risk of injury 
increases. The decision tree used to determine the expected value of soldiers’ outcomes is 
illustrated in Figure 8, and calculations are located in Appendix B, paragraph F. 
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INTERVAL SCALING FOR STATE PREFERENCES 




Figure 8.  Decision tree for soldiers’ expected values of providing security in the 
absence or presence of health support with varying levels of risk and survival. 
The variables are defined as the following: x is the probability of being 
injured, y is the probability of surviving if a soldier is injured and health 
support is provided, and z is the probability of surviving if a soldier does not 
have health support. For this analysis, the probability of surviving an 
injury/illness if medical support is provided (y) is 95%,  the survival rate after 
U.S. medical training in El Salvador in 1983. The probability of surviving an 
injury/illness if medical support is not provided (z) is 55%, which was the 
survival rate in El Salvador prior to the U.S. medical support training. The 
values at the terminal nodes represent the value of the various outcomes.82 
4. Game 1 and 2 with Cardinal Values 
With cardinal utilities for both the state and the soldiers’ preferences calculated 
for a low risk of injury environment, utilities values are entered into the game matrices. 
Figures 9 and 10 illustrate Games 1 and 2 with cardinal values, respectively. 
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DECISION TREE TO DETERMINE SOLDIERS’ EXPECTED VALUES 
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a. Game 1 with Cardinal Values: Soldier versus State in Low-Risk 
Environment 
 
Figure 9.  Game 1 - Soldiers versus the state with low risk of injury to soldiers (1%) 
using cardinal values. The values of the players’ preferences mirror those of 
the game with ordinal values. Both players continue to have a dominant 
strategy with an expected outcome of AD. This outcome, AD, continues to be 
a Nash equilibrium. 
Analysis of this modified Game 1 matrix provides additional information 
about the factors and strength of the preferences for each player. For the soldiers, their 
dominant strategy to provide security is reflected by the large difference in the values of 
their options between providing security and not providing security. In contrast, the 
relative small difference between the outcomes for the state’s preferences suggests a 
weak dominant strategy that might be easily overcome. As illustrated in Game 1 with 
ordinal values, the state has the ability to guarantee security by executing a first move 
advantage. The strength of the soldiers’ dominant preference can reassure the state that 
the soldiers will choose to provide security if the state provides health support. Similarly, 
the power of the strategic threat available to the soldiers is demonstrated with utility 
GAME 1:  SOLDIERS VERSUS STATE IN LOW-RISK ENVIRONMENT 
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values. With a credible threat to stop providing security unless the state provides health 
care, the state risks a substantial loss of utility if it does not acquiesce to the threat. 
b. Game 2 with Cardinal Values: Soldiers versus State in High-Risk 
Environment 
 
Figure 10.  Soldiers versus the state with high-risk of injury to soldiers (67%) using 
cardinal values. As with Game 2 with ordinal values, the soldiers’ decision is 
contingent upon the provision of health support. With both players playing 
conservatively, the likely outcome is BD and represents a Nash equilibrium. 
In this outcome, the soldiers do not provide security and the state does not 
provide medical support. 
Comparing Game 1 to Game 2, the increased risk of injury causes soldier 
preferences to adjust and their behavior becomes dependent on the provision of health 
support. With the same available strategic moves as in Game 2 with ordinal values, the 
state again has both a first move advantage to ensure the soldiers will deliver security and 
a viable strategic promise. Because the increased risk of injury has reduced the utility of 
both outcomes associated with providing security, the state has a significantly greater 
proportional reason to execute either of these moves.  
GAME 2:  SOLDIERS VERSUS STATE IN HIGH-RISK ENVIRONMENT 
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The role of casualty/trauma care to mitigate the impact of increased risk to 
security forces is illustrated in Figure 11. While the expected value for security forces 
decreases with increasing risk, expected value decreases at a slower rate when 
casualty/trauma care is provided. Even at a high level of risk, casualty/trauma care 
prevents soldiers’ expected values from falling below zero, the point at which soldiers 
would modify their behaviors and stop providing security. Sensitivity analysis on the risk 
level provides insight into its effects on soldier behavior. My analysis reveals that as the 
risk of injury approaches or exceeds 61%, soldiers decide to stop providing security (See 
Appendix B, paragraph G for sensitivity analysis computation and explanation). 
 
Figure 11.  Soldier’s Expected Value to Provide Security with Increasing Risk. As the 
risk of injury increases to security personnel, the expected value of providing 
security decreases at a greater rate when casualty/trauma care is not provided. 
When provided, casualty/trauma care mitigates the increased risk and prevents 
it from crossing the threshold where soldiers will not provide security. 
While my analysis solely considers the influence of medical support in 
determining the behavior of security forces, other factors, such as training, leadership, 
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security forces increases, medical support is a key factor and will significantly contribute 
to the decision-making milieu of the security forces. 
H. APPLICATION TO AFGHANISTAN 
Based on the conclusions drawn from the previous analysis, the role of 
casualty/trauma care for Afghan Security Forces is explored for purposes of 
illustration.83   
Following the defeat and displacement of the Taliban regime as the ruling 
authority in Afghanistan in 2002, an international coalition, led by the United States, 
began the long process of nation-building.84 The U.S. predicated its exit strategy from 
Afghanistan on the concept of establishing security in Afghanistan through the 
development and training of local indigenous security forces. While the Afghan National 
Army possessed some organic medical support for its forces, the Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF), as a whole, predominantly relied on the U.S. medical system for 
initial treatment, evacuation, and initial trauma care. After the gradual reestablishment of 
military medical facilities, ANSF patients were usually transferred to Afghan military or 
civilian hospitals once they had been stabilized in coalition medical facilities. 
Unfortunately, Afghan health facilities, including Afghan military hospitals, provided 
dubious care and received relatively little support or training from International Security 
Assistance Force’s (ISAF) medical resources.85  
While training programs to increase the medical capacity of the Afghan medical 
system were occasionally begun by medical commanders who sought to improve Afghan 
facilities and capabilities, these programs usually ended when the commander or unit 
                                                 
83. This example considers the situation in Afghanistan up until 2011, which is when I redeployed 
from the Afghan theater.  
84. The Taliban’s fall from power in Afghanistan was formally declared on 24 January 2002 in 
Richard L. Armitage, “Modification of Description of ‘Territory of Afghanistan Controlled by the Taliban’ 
in Executive Order 13129, “ Public Notice 3899,  Federal Register, 67;19, January 29, 2002, 4301. 
http://www.bis.doc.gov/licensing/pdf/statetalibannotice.pdf 
85. Maria Abi-Habib, “At Afghan Military Hospital, Graft and Deadly Neglect,” Wall Street Journal, 3 
September 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904480904576496703389391710.html 
and Sandra Basu, “U.S. Medical personnel in Impossible Situation Mentoring at Substandard Kabul 
Hospital, U.S. Medicine, August, 2012. http://www.usmedicine.com/articles/us-medical-personnel-in-
impossible-situation-mentoring-at-substandard-kabul-hospital.html 
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rotated out of the theater. While most medical mentoring and military medical capacity-
building focused on the Afghan National Army, support for police forces was negligible 
and ineffective. Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) were 
completely dependent on coalition medical support for competent casualty/trauma care 
for their security operations. I advocated for police to receive their care from local 
civilian Afghan medical clinics, rather than continue with plans to build a separate police 
medical support system that would be difficult to staff and unsustainable.  
Over the past ten years, the Afghan civilian medical system significantly 
improved its public health benchmarks, such as under-five mortality, vaccination rates, 
maternal mortality, and perinatal care.86  Mentored by international health organizations 
and nongovernmental organizations, the Afghan civilian providers often sought to 
distance themselves from security forces by espousing humanitarian and apolitical 
perspectives in order to protect themselves under a banner of neutrality. Despite charges 
of militarizing the humanitarian space by the international health community, coalition 
military forces attempted to conduct medical capacity-building operations with civilian 
physicians and nurses.87  With traumas and security-related injuries comprising less than 
2% of the total number of Afghan deaths in the country, the Ministry of Health 
understandably focused on other priorities, such as primary care access and factors 
affecting under-five mortality and perinatal care.88 Any casualty/trauma care systems had 
to be built on the foundations of this primary care system, which was lacking.89  
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Health care development was further challenged by the Afghan Medical Salary 
policy, last updated in 2005, which led to shortages of health care workers, especially in 
remote and rural areas.90  This policy, designed to establish standardized salaries to stop 
nongovernmental organizations from enticing Afghan physicians out of the public sector 
with larger salaries, failed to adequately provide compensation to attract Afghan 
physicians to serve in rural areas or locations with improving security, resulting in a 
severe shortage of medical providers in rural clinics. As it happens, these rural clinics are 
the very clinics where wounded Afghan Police forces will need to be taken for medical 
support once U.S. forces begin their withdrawal from Afghanistan.  
Despite the relatively high risk of injury in the performance of their security 
duties, the recruitment and effectiveness of Afghan Police, especially Afghan Local 
police (ALP), has been considered robust.91 The situation mirrors the scenario in Game 2 
of the game theory analysis: an evolving security situation with periods of high risk of 
injury from enemy combatants, with coalition forces providing medical support to the 
nascent ALP forces. The provision of health support by coalition forces as a substitute for 
Afghan health support is equivalent to the state’s first move advantage, akin to extending 
a strategic promise to provide health support in the game. This promise, however, does 
not come from the Afghan government, but U.S. forces and their medical system. While 
there is some medical training to ALP at the tactical level, until recently little to no 
development of the Afghan medical system beyond field care has been undertaken in a 
coordinated or systemic fashion throughout the country.   
While many believe the job of developing the civilian health system falls to the 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), PRT success in medical training and 
development has been sporadic and uneven. In Uruzgan Province in 2010–2011, for 
example, the U.S./Australian PRT did not consider civilian medical development one of 
its priorities. While other attempts to build medical capacity in Afghanistan have been 
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attempted, there has been no unifying focus on training professionals in the health system 
to provide trauma care to support security operations once the U.S. medevac system 
departs. As in Game 2, U.S. forces are providing casualty/trauma care, and ALP are 
aggressively conducting their security operations. Once security is established in an area 
and the risk of injury decreases, the situation resembles the scenario illustrated in Game 
1. Soldiers conduct their security operations regardless of the level of casualty/trauma 
support, although it is still available through their American advisors. Meanwhile, the 
dominant health strategy for the state (in this instance, the Afghan Ministry of Health) 
cannot afford to emphasize developing medical support for security forces due to the 
overwhelming medical needs of the civilian population.   
The absence of competent casualty/trauma care for security forces may not be 
revealed until the U.S. stops providing casualty/trauma support to ANSF operations. As 
U.S. forces depart and ALP begin operating without U.S. medical support, Game 1 
predicts ALP will continue to conduct their security operations until they are significantly 
challenged. If ANSF perceive their risk of injury as too high, Game 2 predicts that ALP 
will stop conducting security operations. Alternatively, security forces might elect to 
decrease their risk of injury by brokering treaties with insurgents or criminal elements to 
decrease the threat of injury and avoid confrontation.92 In lieu of fighting their opponents 
as part of effective operations, security forces will likely conduct faux security operations 
in order to save face, or they may stop conducting security operations altogether. Either 
of these outcomes will lead to an absence of effective security and weaken the Afghan 
government’s legitimacy once the U.S. medical support is no longer available. 
I. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the revelations elucidated through game theory analysis, developing and 
supporting a casualty/trauma system to provide care to security forces could increase the 
reliability of security forces. This leads to the following recommendations: 
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1. States must recognize the dynamics identified in this game analysis and take 
steps to prevent a loss of security through the absence of casualty/trauma care 
to security forces. States might be tempted to perceive the activities of 
security personnel conducting their missions in a low risk environment as a 
success and discount the need to provide casualty/trauma care. This facade of 
reliability, however, may not be revealed until security forces are significantly 
challenged. Without casualty/trauma care, these forces may elect to stop 
conducting security operations or broker deals with their opponents. States 
can effectively prevent this by investing in competent and capable medical 
support for their security forces. 
2. If states have limited resources, they should focus their casualty/trauma support 
in areas with the highest levels of insecurity in order to mitigate the perceived 
increased risk of injury. This may conflict with the need to provide medical 
services to civilians, but states do not face an either/or decision. Effort to 
focus civilian medical capacity development on trauma care benefits both the 
security and civilian sectors. While civilian medical care is important, 
ignoring casualty/trauma support to security forces prevents the establishment 
of lasting security, a prerequisite for effective development. 
3. Foreign forces providing training and mentoring support to indigenous forces 
must identify and support indigenous development of an appropriate medical 
system to care for injured security forces. The casualty/trauma support system 
must be sustainable and appropriate for the level of care needed. 
4. U.S. forces conducting medical engagements as part of stability or 
reconstruction efforts should focus their medical engagements on efforts that 
directly improve medical support to security operations. Depending on the 
country, this may require improving the civilian medical system.  
J. CONCLUSION 
Game theory provides a theoretical framework for exploring the influence of 
casualty/trauma care and the willingness of security forces to conduct missions in areas 
of varying levels of risk. Most states recognize that enforceable security is a prerequisite 
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for stability and economic and social development. If states truly desire to establish and 
maintain increased levels of security, they must proactively develop and support the 
medical system that provides care to their warriors. For those seeking to stabilize and 
improve weak or failed states, medical support development is a critical component of 
security development and critical to improving the chances of success. 
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V. THE ADDITIONAL BENEFITS STRENGTHENING THE 
SECURITY FORCE MEDICAL SYSTEM 
The U.S. military’s comparative advantage in counterterrorist and stability 
operations lies in the quality of its manpower, not its quantity. U.S. forces 
are simply too expensive to be committed in large numbers to the defense 
of peripheral interests. This means avoiding direct U.S. interventions and 
instead emphasizing training, advising, equipping, and supporting allies 
and partners confronting internal security threats. 
–Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.93  
 
While providing medical care to security forces strengthens the delivery of 
security by mitigating the risks of injury, a robust security force medical institution can 
strengthen a state beyond mere security; it can serve as the key state medical institution 
that drives medical development and advancement in the state overall. By leveraging its 
role and presence throughout the state, a capable security force medical system can 
enhance a state’s legitimacy. By strengthening security force medical institutions beyond 
trauma/casualty care, U.S. efforts would redound in numerous ways.  
Using an organizational approach, this chapter explores the indirect benefits of a 
strong security force medical system to: individuals considering service, those already in 
service, the security force institutions they serve in, the public health sector, the state, the 
region, and the United States of America.  
A. BENEFITS TO THOSE CONSIDERING OR CURRENTLY SERVING IN 
SECURITY FORCES 
For those considering service, the promise of adequate medical care and support 
incentivizes their willingness to join. In countries with substandard or developing medical 
capability, volunteering for service provides individuals access to competent and capable 
medical care for themselves and/or members of their family. In the United States 
military, for example, it is universally accepted that receipt of medical care is both an 
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incentive and a tool of compensation.94 For those already serving, failing to receive 
proper access to medical care discourages continued service. Recent shortcomings and 
proposed changes to U.S. military medical care, for example, have prompted concerns 
about the U.S. military’s ability to attract and retain qualified individuals, and military 
exit and retention surveys have consistently identified health and medical care as 
significant factors.95 In developing or underdeveloped states, strong security medical 
systems could provide an incentive for both service and retention. 
Providing medical care to family members influences security force personnel in 
the performance of their duties, as well. When medical services are extended to family 
members, security officers are confident that their family’s medical needs will be cared 
for while the security officer is deployed or conducting operations. Rather than worrying 
about events back home, security personnel are able to focus on their duties. Efforts to 
strengthen the medical support to security forces and their families, therefore, strengthen 
the resolve of those serving in the security sector.96 
B. BENEFITS TO THE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS 
As security institutions are composed of individuals, individuals’ willingness to 
serve and remain in the security sector directly translates into benefits for security 
organizations. With increased recruitment and retention, security organizations are able to 
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maintain a pool of applicants with a greater breadth of talent and potential. Larger 
recruitment and retention pools allow organizations to establish and maintain higher 
standards of conduct and behavior, as well as greater technical expertise. Improved 
retention decreases personnel turnover and provides a greater investment return on the 
resources spent to train security personnel.97 
Caring for the individuals in one’s organization, a fundamental component of 
leadership and professionalism, strengthens the professional milieu of the security 
organization, improves morale, and communicates to the individual and his/her family 
that they are valued by the organization.98  For an institution that strives to inculcate its 
members with a service mentality and professional behavior, providing medical care 
models the values the institution expects of its members. 
From a readiness perspective, medical care ensures and protects the physical 
preparedness of the force to conduct security operations. History has repeatedly 
demonstrated the profound impact of disease and non-battle injuries on the ability of 
security organizations to deploy and maintain an effective force.99  A medical system that 
seeks to prevent and treat the diseases and environmental hazards experienced in conflict 
strengthens the security institution by maintaining a fit and capable fighting force.100 
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C. BENEFITS TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH SECTOR 
The benefits of a competent security force medical system extend beyond the 
security sector. Security forces routinely operate in areas with stunted development and 
inadequate public services (e.g., public and private hospitals for the civilian populace). A 
strong security force medical system not only supports security operations under these 
conditions, but can be used to provide care to the civilian populace and build local 
capacity to support the public health sector. With expanded resources and an ability to 
operate in austere conditions, a robust security force medical system can provide medical 
care in areas where other government entities cannot, thereby providing essential care 
until the civilian sector develops. The security forces, in turn, benefit by demonstrating 
their service to the population. If done correctly and professionally, medical “civic 
action” missions connect the security forces to the population and demonstrate that the 
security forces are there to serve the people, and not the other way around.101  Thanks to 
the provision of medical care until security improves and their partnering with the health 
department or nongovernmental organizations to build capacity, the security force’s 
medical system can benefit both the public health sector and the population.    
Security force capabilities in the areas of advanced communications, 
coordination, logistics, and transportation can also augment the delivery of civilian 
healthcare through partnerships with the public health sector. These partnerships can be 
used to test or explore new or innovative approaches to public health. In the late 1960s, 
for example, the United States launched a comprehensive campaign to improve traffic 
safety. Interagency efforts investigated techniques to reduce the death and morbidity 
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associated with motor vehicle accidents, and one of these programs was the Military 
Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) program in 1970. Leveraging military 
helicopters and flight medics to quickly respond to motor vehicle accidents outside of 
urban areas, the program was conducted as a joint endeavor between the Departments of 
Defense, Transportation, and Health, Education and Welfare. The pilot program 
demonstrated the efficacy and viability of using military aircraft in partnership with local 
health systems to respond to emergencies. Eventually civilianized, this program became 
the nucleus of the modern domestic aeromedical ambulance service. The willingness of 
all involved parties to partner to solve a public safety/health problem was facilitated by a 
robust and capable military medical system.102 
D. BENEFITS TO THE STATE 
States obviously benefit by maintaining prepared, trained, and emboldened 
security forces to conduct security operations. A strong military and internal security 
force are critical to protecting the state. Both require a robust medical organization to 
support them. The state also benefits from maintaining a capable security force medical 
system that can: provide medical care to the civilian population when it is not available 
through the public sector, respond to disasters or emergencies when the civilian medical 
system is overwhelmed, and partner with other government agencies to develop solutions 
to complex problems. In fact, any endeavor that attempts to create security or stability 
through the use of security forces would benefit from a supporting professional medical 
system. Consider, for instance, the range of stability tasks needed after conflict, such as 
establishing civil security, maintaining civil control, restoring essential services, 
supporting governance, and assisting economic and infrastructure development.103 
Investment in the security force medical system also signals the state’s attitude 
toward the value of its citizens, especially those who serve on behalf of their state. Being 
able to treat its citizens well, literally, makes the state’s commitment clear to the 
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population at large and to the international community. While it seems logical to provide 
medical care to the injured who can be salvaged and returned to duty, providing medical 
care to those seriously wounded who are beyond the ability to return to duty 
communicates a national moral ethic of service and the expectation of reciprocity.104  A 
capable medical system communicates the intent of the state to meet its ethical obligation 
to its warriors and reveals the value it places on service to the state.  
E. BENEFITS TO THE REGION 
As a strong and capable state security force strengthens a state, a robust state has 
the potential to stabilize a region. When states partner and strengthen their immediate 
neighbors, the region benefits from increased security through collaboration, dialogue, 
and reinforcing support. Security cooperation facilitates regional security and enhances 
the ability of partners to respond in coordination. Regional medical interoperability has 
the potential to leverage the medical strengths of multiple states to create synergies that 
enable them to solve challenging health problems and to contribute to regional security. 
When state security forces have robust medical capabilities, medical institutions are able 
to collaborate to solve regional health problems, address medical threats, and develop 
interoperability. Effort by U.S. forces to strengthen partner security medical systems not 
only supports regional ownership of local problems, but is more likely to result in 
appropriate and sustainable solutions to regional problems. 
F. BENEFITS TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
The United States benefits whenever it works with partner nation-states to 
develop and strengthen their medical support, especially since encouraging and 
supporting security force medical systems establishes institutions that can be leveraged to 
directly rebuild civil society and become the locus for regional partnering and 
strengthening. Since health issues and medical threats rarely stop at borders, building up 
regional actors’ ability to support each other during crises, disasters, and health 
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emergencies will decrease the requirement for U.S. forces to engage in overt 
interventions.   
For the Geographical Commander, health engagements to strengthen partner 
military forces can be leveraged to connect the government with the population and 
strengthen state legitimacy. More significantly, during a regional disaster, medical crisis, 
or disease outbreak, state responses inevitably include security forces. Having established 
and maintained a working dialogue with the partner nation-state’s security force medical 
establishment well ahead of an emergency, the Geographical Commander will have an 
accurate picture of the capabilities of his partners and their ability to handle the crisis and 
of the need for U.S. support. Established medical partnerships will expedite the 
identification of appropriate U.S. backing and support integration thanks to previously 
held medical exercises and training. 
Prioritizing the strengthening of the medical support of security forces also 
provides a development focus that mitigates criticism by international and 
nongovernmental organizations who are conducting concurrent health development 
activities. NGOs often charge the U.S. military with “militarizing the humanitarian 
zone,” and cite an increased risk to their workers who rely on their neutrality and 
impartiality for protection.105  By first focusing on strengthening the partner security 
force medical system, the U.S. strengthens security and develops a cadre of indigenous 
trainers who could be used by the state to help develop the civilian health sector 
internally. This, however, does not imply that the U.S. military efforts should be 
restricted to the military. Some security forces, such as police or other paramilitary units, 
often rely on local civilian medical facilities for their care.   
Engagements with civilian facilities or organizations that provide trauma/medical 
care to security forces must be part of any strengthening effort. In some instances, 
engagement with these organizations may be even more critical given the threat. 
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Consequently, engagements to strengthen these organizations should focus initially on 
the systems and training needed to provide reliable trauma and casualty care to support 
security operations. The next priority should be general medical care which would 
facilitate routine care to members of the security forces, as well as civilians. Efforts to 
expand the development focus to other segments of medical care, such as pediatric or 
obstetrical care, may best be addressed later, despite the need for these services. NGOs 
and IGOs, who often have more experience developing pediatric and obstetric 
capabilities, could then more easily focus on developing medical capacity that does not 
overlap with the care needed to support security forces.   
Maintaining a focus on security and security support not only provides the 
justification for engaging with the civilian health sector, but limits the room for friction. 
The civilian populace, however, would still benefit from U.S. military efforts since the 
skills, equipment, and knowledge needed to support the security forces directly overlaps 
with certain civilian medical needs (e.g., motor vehicle accidents, domestic violence, and 
preventive medicine). 
In conclusion, strengthening the medical systems supporting security operations 
offers many multifaceted and interrelated indirect benefits beyond improving security 
force effectiveness. These benefits extend from the individual security officer to the 
region.   
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VI. INTERVENTIONS TO BUILD PARTNER MEDICAL 
CAPACITY  
The key to the entire program is in the selection of personnel. It will 
require personnel who are tactful and diplomatic, willing and eager to 
teach, and who have a sincere desire to contribute to the medical 
knowledge of these people. It must be remembered that these hospitals are 
not under our command. Any attitude of superiority or condescension on 
our part will be resented and our task made more difficult. 
–Colonel Raymond E. Duke, MC, Chief, Plans and Operations 
Division, Medical Section, Headquarters, Army Forces Far East, on 
the type of trainers needed to assist in rebuilding South Korea’s 
military medical system, 1953.106 
 
Despite the direct and indirect benefits of nurturing a strong indigenous medical 
system to support partner security forces, U.S. military medical strengthening efforts 
have been primarily focused on providing care to civilians, rather than developing 
medical support for security forces. Over the past two decades of preparing and 
responding to disaster situations where U.S. forces augmented humanitarian efforts, 
military medicine has provided direct care when needed and then disengaged as soon as 
possible. Following guidance to avoid committing to long-term development, military 
medicine provided intermittent or temporary care designed to meet immediate 
humanitarian needs or build American good will abroad.  
This chapter reviews the U.S. military medical system’s typical focus on 
providing direct care to foreign civilians, examines recent changes to joint doctrine 
advocating partner health system development, and proposes a framework and 
recommendations for developing within the U.S. military the capability to build partner 
medical capacity.  
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A. EFFORTS TO RESTRICT LONG TERM MEDICAL ENGAGEMENTS 
Medical support for U.S. armed forces constitutes a significant investment in both 
human and physical capital. As both a managed healthcare system caring for patients 
around the world and as a form of “soft” power used to support national strategic goals, 
U.S. military medicine is integral to every operation, both at home and abroad. In fact, 
the roles and capabilities of military medicine provide strategic, operational, and tactical 
military leaders with a capability that extends well beyond the support of combat troops 
by facilitating interaction with foreign civilian populations and 
humanitarian/development actors.107  According to Joint Publication 4-02, Health 
Service Support, the Military Health System (MHS) “supports the operational mission by 
fostering, protecting, sustaining, and restoring health.”108 The U.S. military meets these 
requirements by operating a worldwide medical system. During war, expeditionary 
medical resources extend the MHS network to military members in combat and 
contingency missions. While the primacy of the MHS mission focuses on maintaining the 
health of deployed U.S. forces, it commonly cares for civilians as part of disaster 
response and stability operations, and partners with other military medical institutions to 
provide tactical medical care. 
Given the relative size, technical capability, and standard of care provided by the 
U.S. MHS, however, most partnering efforts to support foreign security forces or 
civilians results in U.S. medical personnel directly providing care, rather than working 
by, with, and through the indigenous military or civilian healthcare system.109 As a 
result, recent stability operations have focused on short-term, intermittent medical 
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missions to provide disaster and humanitarian assistance medicine where indigenous 
capability has been devastated or non-existent. In situations which required strengthening 
the indigenous medical system, efforts to build partner capacity resulted from sporadic 
individual efforts or as a result of needs identified by the MHS. Efforts to reconstruct 
Afghan military hospitals, for example, were driven by the urgent need to transfer 
Afghan patients out of coalition hospitals to make space for coalition patients. Efforts to 
systematically strengthen the ANSF medical support system to provide its own care to its 
security forces were significantly overshadowed by the vast U.S. resources expended to 
provide direct medical care to ANSF security forces and civilians.   
B. PROVIDING DIRECT CARE TO CIVILIANS AS PART OF 
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS 
During recent stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. military medical 
forces struggled to focus and restrict treatment to the care of combat casualties and were 
overwhelmed by requests to provide care to the non-military population. However, 
military medical resources were not resourced or tasked to replace civilian medical 
systems. While it proved relatively easier to prevent “mission creep” at military hospitals 
at larger bases, tactical medical providers with combat units at forward outposts were 
constantly asked to care for civilian patients, often brought to the aid stations by U.S. 
soldiers. As commanders attempted to leverage military medical capabilities as part of 
counterinsurgency strategies, pressure to use military medical resources to meet civilian 
needs increased.   
To avoid long-term commitments, medical engagements were typically focused 
on providing immediate care to the civilian population, often in the hope of winning 
people over, connecting with them, and meeting their pressing medical needs. 
Unfortunately, these efforts resulted in little long-term value and were often considered 
unnecessarily risky and potentially harmful.110   
                                                 
110. Malsby, “Into which end does the thermometer go? Application of military medicine in 
counterinsurgency: does direct patient care by American service members work?” and Michael J. Tarpey, 
“The Role of the U.S. Army in Health System Reconstruction and Development During 
Counterinsurgency,” (master’s thesis, Army Command and General Staff College, 2012). 
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As an appreciation for the role of capacity-building in stability operations 
increased, many units attempted to include indigenous medical personnel in their medical 
engagements to give them the appearance of capacity-building. In reality, though, it was 
evident that building capacity requires a long-term commitment under a coordinated 
policy. With the guidance provided in Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 
21st Century Defense to “...seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new 
partnerships with a growing number of nations...,” efforts to strengthen the medical 
support to U.S. partner security forces seems to be the ideal way to “...develop innovative, 
low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on 
exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.”111  
C. GUIDANCE FROM CURRENT JOINT DOCTRINE 
Prior to the directive to build partner capacity, joint publications had identified 
medical and health capacity-building tasks as components of stability operations. Joint 
Publication 3–07, Stability Operations, for instance, emphasized the use of U.S. medical 
services to provide direct care to both military and civilian populations to foster stability 
and provide essential services. Without specific guidance for BPC, however, military 
medical support continued to focus on providing direct care to civilian and security force 
members, rather than building indigenous medical capacity. While a focus on direct care 
is often necessary during initial stability operations, capacity-building endeavors must be 
started early during stabilization efforts to ensure local capacity exists before U.S. 
military forces depart. Joint Publication 4-02, Health Service Support, recognizes that 
care provided by U.S. medical personnel may be of higher quality than that supported by 
the indigenous public health service and recommends transitioning to building partner 
medical capacity to decrease U.S. direct care to civilians and strengthen the local medical 
system. 
The efficiency and effectiveness with which U.S. forces can deliver 
humanitarian assistance, particularly medical and dental care, can have the 
unintended consequence of decreasing the population’s confidence in the 
                                                 
111. Department of Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:  Priorities for 21st Century 
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[host nation’s] ability to provide basic care. Possibly even worse, 
excessive U.S. humanitarian assistance may delay and undermine the 
reconstitution of existing medical and other basic needs infrastructure in 
the [host nation]. To mitigate these possibilities, primary consideration 
should be given to supporting and supplementing existing 
infrastructure.112  
Additionally, JP 4-02 warns that during efforts to build partner capacity, “...care 
must be taken to ensure that health care standards are appropriate for the local population 
and at a level that can be maintained....”113  
Joint Publication 3–29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, echoes the importance 
of medical personnel being prepared to conduct medical capacity-building missions.  
Medical personnel may be called on to assist in reestablishing and 
supporting indigenous medical infrastructure, particularly those affected 
by disaster. Improving the medical systems near U.S. and multinational 
forces fosters self-sufficiency and may contribute to accomplishing the 
U.S. military mission sooner.114 
Interestingly, Joint Publication 3-57, Civil Military Operations, lists health service 
support activities that support civil-military operations. The majority of these activities 
involve training and development engagements designed to strengthen indigenous 
medical systems and build partner capacity in the process (see Figure 12). The 
development of a health system to support the military field care and evacuation system, 
the major theme of my thesis, is listed among these activities. 
                                                 
112. Joint Publication 4-02, III-22. 
113. Ibid., III-26. 
114. Department of Defense, JP 3–29: Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, March 17, 2009, xxvii. 
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Figure 12.  Health Services Support Activities in Civil-Military Operations115 
Directly advocating the role of health service support during stability and civil-
military operations, Joint Publication 4-02, Health Services Support, further recognizes 
the challenges of conducting health support activities during stability and civil-military 
operations (e.g., cultural differences, language, and sustainability). Highlighting the need 
for experts in global health and medical development to guide medical and health 
engagements, JP 4-02 advocates that “[military-civilian] teams that plan and conduct 
stability operations should include personnel with medical expertise, foreign language 
proficiency, and cultural understanding.”116  More specifically, it states that the military 
leadership  
...should ensure that during medical civil-military operations missions the 
medical staff includes an international health officer or [subject matter 
expert] with regional medical expertise and linguistic proficiency that can 
foster partnerships with military, civilian, multinational and USG 
personnel...117 
                                                 
115. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-57: Civil-Military Operations, July 8, 2008, II-17. 
116. JP 4-02, V-2. 
117. Ibid., V-5. 
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As with Joint Doctrine, Service-specific doctrine highlights similar themes of 
including building partner medical capacity activities into stabilization and reconstruction 
operations. Army Field Manual 8–42, lists “[promoting] and enhancing the growth 
potential of a HN medical infrastructure” and “[planning] for and developing programs 
which provide direct patient care support for both HN military and civilian populations” 
among the combat health support programs included in stability operations.118 Similarly, 
Army Technical Publication 3–07.5, Stability Techniques, recognizes that while Army 
units may need to “provide emergency medical care to address short-term needs, 
[ultimately], host-nation medical services require infrastructure, medical staff, training 
and education, medical logistics, and public health programs.”119  ATP 3–07.5 provides a 
framework to guide public health development by dividing public health support into 
three categories: initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability (see  
Figure 13).  
 
Figure 13.  Phases to support public health programs.120 
Despite several calls for the development of joint medical humanitarian 
specialists, as well as doctrine highlighting the importance of building partner medical 
capacity into of stability operations, there have been few efforts to formalize or 
institutionalize the U.S. military’s ability to strengthen partner medical systems 
                                                 
118. Department of the Army, Field Manual 8–42: Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and 
Support Operations, October 27, 1997, 1–7.  
119. Department of the Army, ATP 3–07.5: Stability Techniques, August 2012, 4–13. 
120. Ibid. 
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supporting security forces or civilians.121  Most previous efforts have consisted of ad hoc 
or one-off missions, usually in concert with disaster response.   
D. RECENT MEDICAL ADVISING 
The substantial stability operations undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan led to the 
deployment of military advisors to support military and public health leaders, but the 
preparation and training for these individuals and coordination of their efforts with other 
agencies and combat units was typically lacking and uncoordinated. Even Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams, fielded in both theaters to direct and coordinate U.S. government 
efforts across all of the development and reconstruction domains, experienced varied 
levels of success, often the result of chance assignments of individuals with the right 
combination of skills and personality for the task. On some PRTs, medical and health 
development were under-prioritized or unsupported and were only used to provide 
medical coverage to convoys, rather than to engage and coordinate health development.   
Institutional emphasis in developing a medical BPC capability has been fitful, at 
best. For military medical professionals assigned to combat forces engaged in 
counterinsurgency and stability operations, the ability or willingness to contribute to 
stability operations through medical capacity-building, in lieu of direct care activities, has 
been atypical.122  Until military medical personnel are trained and instructed on the value 
and techniques of medical capacity-building, they will invariably default to providing 
direct care.   
The establishment of the U.S. Air Force’s International Health Specialist (IHS) 
Program stands out as a notable exception. Established in 2001 by Air Force Surgeon 
General Paul K. Carlton, and modeled after the Army’s Foreign Area Officer program, 
the IHS program seeks to establish a cadre of medical personnel 
                                                 
121. Edwin K. Burkett, “Foreign Health Sector Capacity Building and the U.S. Military,” Military 
Medicine 177, no.3 (March 2012): 296–301 and Ramey L. Wilson, Alex G. Truesdell, and Jean E. Rinaldo, 
“Why the military needs humanitarian specialists,” Military Medicine 170, no. 4 (April 2005): xi-xiii. 
122. Many caring and compassionate medical professionals who deployed with combat troops were 
prohibited from engaging in development activities due to operational or policy constraints. Others, 
however, were unwilling or uninterested in supporting BPC missions. When I queried one such physician 
as to why he was not willing to assist the struggling local health system, he responded, “I did not come over 
here to be a Doctors’ Without Borders!”  
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…fully qualified in their primary role as either [Air Force Medical 
System] health-care providers or support staff who have (1) additional 
language and cultural competency, (2) expertise in regional medical 
threats and infrastructure, (3) knowledge of joint and interagency 
coordination processes, and (4) the ability to build medical “bridges” to 
support coalition partnerships.123 
Once trained, the individuals are organized into regionally aligned teams to 
…support theater engagement plan, create partnerships with medical 
colleagues from nations within their region, facilitate military-to-military 
and military-to-civilian interactions, and support medical-planning 
operations and deployment execution within their [area of operations].124 
Other than the IHS program, no coordinated programs have been designed to 
synchronize or oversee medical BPC efforts across the military services. While several 
recent studies have been conducted to assist the different services to develop strategies 
for building partner capacity for stability operations, none of these studies emphasizes the 
role of building partner medical capacity.125  Unfortunately, resources developed to assist 
in capacity-building engagements or to capture lessons learned in current stability 
operations only list the medical support requirements for advisor teams, rather than 
promoting the idea of advisors who would improve the medical sector in either the 
civilian or security domains.126 This is not surprising given the distinct separation 
between combat forces and most of those who serve in the U.S. military medical system. 
                                                 
123. Jane B. Ward, Kerrie G. Lindberg, Daniel S. McNulty, and Mona P. Ternus, “A Global 
Engagement Enhancer:  The International Health Specialist.” Air and Space Power Journal 16, no. 3 (Fall 
2002): 93. http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/fal02/Fall02.pdf 
124. Paul K. Carlton, Jr., “New Millennium, New Mind-Set: The Air Force Medical Service in the Air 
Expeditionary Era,” Aerospace Power Journal 15, no.4 (Winter 2001): 8–13, 11, 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/win01/win01.pdf. 
125. Jefferson P. Marquis, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Justin Beck, Derek Eaton, Scott Hiromoto, David 
R. Howell, Janet Lewis, Charlotte lynch, Michael J. Neumann, and Catheryn Quantic Thurston, 
“Developing an Army Strategy for Building Partner Capacity for Stability Operations,” Report, RAND 
Institute, 2010.  
126. Examples include Commander’s Handbook for Security Force Assistance, Joint Center for 
International Security Force Assistance, July 14, 2008, and the Security Force Assistance Planners’ Guide, 
Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, February 14, 2008. A notable exception is the 
Medical Mentor/Trainer/Advisory Manual: Healthcare Development of the Afghan National Security 
Forces, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, 
ISAF Joint Command, March 2010.   
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E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUILDING PARTNER MEDICAL 
CAPACITY 
While a complete review of the current authorizations and programs that focus on 
security force assistance and capacity-building programs is beyond the scope of my 
thesis, this chapter proposes several ideas or concepts that are based on prior advising and 
strengthening efforts and could be used as tools to strengthen medical support to foreign 
security forces through partnering efforts.127  In reality, many of these recommendations 
have proven effective in building relationships and partnering with foreign military and 
state organizations by other military programs, such as the Army Foreign Area Officer 
program. Adopting their principles to the medical sector would help the military leverage 
the current capacity and expertise residing in the U.S. military healthcare system to build 
partner capacity through education, training, and enduring relationships. 
Following the guidance provided in the National Defense Strategy, 
recommendations address three broad categories: advisors, exercises, and rotational 
presence.128 
1. Building Partner Medical Capacity through Advisors 
At the core of developing an institutional capacity to build partner medical 
capacity must be a cadre of global health and development experts who can 
professionalize medical BPC and provide a bridge between the many stakeholders and 
actors. While many of the needed essential skills identified to conduct medical BPC exist 
in the military (e.g., public health officers, medical providers, civil affairs officers, and 
foreign affairs officers), individuals with the correct mix of skills and attitudes to 
primarily focus on global health and medical development are not found in any one 
                                                 
127. Nina M. Serafino, “Security Assistance Reform: ‘Section 1206’: Background and Issues for 
Congress,” Congressional Research Service RS22855, January 13, 2012, Charles W. Hooper, “Going 
Farther by Going Together: Building Partner Capacity in Africa,” Joint Forces Quarterly 67, no.4 (2012), 
Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, and Amy Richardson, Preparing the Army for Stability Operations (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 2007), Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, and Heather Peterson, Improving Capacity for 
Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (Santa Monica: RAND, 2009),  
128. Department of Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:  Priorities for 21st Century 
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functional organization.129 Instead, the skills are spread out among several different 
disciplines.  
Public health officers develop training and community programs to promote 
health and readiness through preventive medicine programs and policy development on 
U.S. bases and in military units.130  Medical providers, assigned to clinics and medical 
centers, possess the technical medical expertise to deliver medical care and teach the art 
of medicine. While Civil Affairs officers bridge the link between civil-military domains 
to assist in restoring essential services and interacting with the international development 
community, most of these professionals are in the Reserves and consider health as only 
one of their many concerns.131 Foreign area officers, trained in politico-military affairs 
and the language and culture of their assigned region, have no medical training or 
experience, but are positioned to create military relationships at the strategic and 
operational levels.132   
What is needed for building partner medical capacity and stability operations is to 
draw from  these different skillsets to create medical development professionals able to: 
assess the medical needs of our partners, develop programs with partner nation-states to 
meet their needs, coordinate with the international and development community, 
synchronize the programs with the relevant U.S. regional strategy, provide key advice 
and technical guidance to our partners, and expertly leverage medical capabilities in the 
armed forces to facilitate partner training.   
                                                 
129.  “Broadening Military Culture,” Chapter 6 of Hans Bennendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, 
Transforming For Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 
University Press, 2004), provides an analysis on the generic skills needed by those participating in BPC 
endeavors. Bennendijk and Johnson write that professional military education must plays a role “…in 
changing the military’s cultural mindset…” by preparing for stabilization and reconstruction tasks (page 
92). 
130. Department of Defense, “Emergency Health Powers on Military Installations,” DoD Directive 
6200.3, May 12, 2003, http://www.vaccines.mil/documents/925d62003p.pdf. 
131. Of note, the military physicians serving as military surgeons in Civil Affairs battalions are often 
physicians with public health/preventive medicine training. Department of Defense, “Civil Affairs,” DoD 
Directive 2000.13, June 27, 1994, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/200013p.pdf 
132. Department of Defense, “Military Department Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs,” DoD 
Directive 1315.17, April 28, 2005, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/131517p.pdf. 
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 The health development professionals I envision with skills in the language and 
culture of their region, should be able to advise at multiple levels. Within our military 
organizations, they can serve as advisors to commanders about how best to build partner 
medical capacity to support security and stability. With our partners, they can serve as 
technical experts and advisors to develop and conduct strengthening programs. With the 
broader military medical and international development communities, they can serve as 
key nodes for synchronizing the smart application of health development to strengthen 
security. 
The Air Force’s IHS program provides a useful. By aligning BPC health 
specialists with the COCOM regions, medical experts would be able to support the 
theater security plan, work between the different levels of command, and provide a 
bridge to medical training resources. Expanding on the IHS program could include 
increased contact with partner countries, facilitated by placing medical advisors in partner 
military and state health organizations. From these locations, medical/public health 
advisors would be able to vertically and horizontally integrate the health development 
endeavors throughout a region.  
2. Building Partner Medical Capacity through Exercises 
With advisors positioned to establish and cultivate relationships with key leaders 
and organizations, U.S. medical resources could be leveraged during short-term visits, 
military exercises, and training to promote partner strengthening. By avoiding the 
continued practice of discrete training events that are not tied to long-term programs or 
development, advisors would be able to work with the host nation-state to identify 
training or support needs and coordinate for training during exercises. As the majority of 
military medical education and training resides in the medical education programs at 
military medical centers, the ability to resource specific events from medical education 
centers could improve the quality of training and enable U.S. military providers to use 
their skills to support strategic objectives. 
A recent RAND report prepared for the Air Force’s Special Operations Command 
on building partner medical capacity recommends a framework for conducting exercises 
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to strengthen partner medical programs. This framework divides an exercise into four 
phases and outlines the role of health development advisors across all four phases.133  
Throughout, technical experts from U.S.-based medical centers or centers of excellence 
can be rotated in to provide needed technical expertise or training during any part of this 
process (see Figure 14).  
 
Figure 14.  Framework for a Hypothetical Building Partner Capacity-Health Training 
Program134 
In addition to suggesting a framework for development activities, the RAND 
study proposes generic metrics for each phase of the endeavor (see Figure 15). These 
metrics would provide excellent feedback and conditions-based triggers for supporting 
                                                 
133. David E. Thaler, Gary Cecchine, Anny Wong, and Timothy Jackson, “Building Partner Health 
Capacity with U.S. Military Forces: Enhancing AFSOC Health Engagement Missions,” RAND Technical 
Report No.1201 (2012),  
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2012/RAND_TR1201.pdf 
134. Ibid., 35. 
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partner development efforts and assisting in linking the exercise to the long-term 
development of the medical system and other strengthening efforts.135 
 
Figure 15.  Generic Metrics for the Four Phases of a BPC-Health Effort136 
3. Building Partner Medical Capacity through Rotational Presence and 
Exchanges 
While continual engagement with partner medical systems would be augmented 
by intermittent support from training teams from the United States, institutionalized and 
regular exchanges with our partners could provide a rotational presence that, over time, 
strengthens both the state partner and builds our ability to conduct medical partnering. 
While partnering has traditionally consisted of face-to-face interaction requiring that U.S. 
personnel be sent to interact with partners abroad, a rotation-based presence could also 
include bringing key individuals from the partner state to the United States to work in our 
system and, thereby, leverage the benefits of our technology directly. 
 Individuals from partner medical systems who show promise of becoming future 
leaders could be brought to the United States to train inside the U.S. military medical 
                                                 
135. Another excellent reference for designing development projects with embedded metrics can be 
found in Marla C. Haims, Melinda Moore, Harold D. Green, Jr., and Cythnia Clapp-Wincek, “Developing a 
Prototype Handbook for Monitoring and Evaluating Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance 
Projects,” RAND Center for Military Health Policy Research, Technical Report, 2011. While this 
document provides a systems-based approach to designing programs that could be used as part of medical 
capacity building, it unfortunately falls short when specifically addressing health programs. For example, 
the recommended metric for capacity building in health infrastructure measures the number of personnel 
trained on construction techniques, not medical capacity. 
136. Cecchine Thaler, Wong, and Jackson, “Building Partner Health Capacity with U.S. Military 
Forces: Enhancing AFSOC Health Engagement Missions,” 38. 
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system to gain additional expertise and skills. Similarly, U.S. medical personnel 
interested in working as future advisors could be sent to work within our partners’ 
medical systems. The benefits of these exchanges is proven and well recognized within 
Security Cooperation communities, and the U.S. military has already heavily invested in 
complementary mutual exchanges.137  These practices should be extended to the realm of 
public health and military medicine.  
Similarly, in states of particular interest, institutionally-based partnerships could 
be strengthened on a persistent basis. As suggested by Bradley Boetig in a recent article 
in Military Medicine, establishing partnerships between military hospitals, for example, 
with partner hospitals “would yield benefits for a whole new realm of stakeholders 
including interagency partners, nongovernmental organizations, the service members 
themselves, and academic and training institutions.”138  By providing a framework based 
on institutions, rather than individuals, “...the institution provides the continuity that 
sustains the relationship beyond the assignment cycle of the individuals.”139 In this way, 
the relationships between partner individuals (and organizations) and U.S. advisors (and 
organizations) would be mutually reinforcing and would promote persistent strengthening 
efforts. 
Technological advances in communications and networking provide additional 
tools to sustain and promote these relationships.140 By integrating distributed learning 
with medical simulations and social networking platforms and video teleconferences, 
technology could be leveraged to strengthen capacity-building engagements. In 
                                                 
137. Department of the Army, “Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training,” Department of 
the Army Regulation 12–15, SECNAVINST 4950.4B, AFI 16–105, January 3, 2011, 
http://www.apd.army.mil/jw2/xmldemo/r12_15/head.asp and Manuel Torres, “Military exchange program 
benefits U.S., Canadian, Mexican military forces,” U.S. Army North Public Affairs, July 15, 2010, 
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 138. Bradley J. Boetig, “Bilateral institutional relationships: a new mission for U.S. DoD medical 
capabilities in support of health diplomacy,” Military Medicine 177, no. 7 (July 2012): 763–765.  
139. Ibid., 764. 
140. In Chapter 7 (“Supporting Technologies”) of Hans Bennendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, 
Transforming For Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 
University Press, 2004), the additional roles and benefits of leveraging technology as part of stabilization 
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Afghanistan, for example, civilian providers near one of the forward operating bases 
requested training on burn management in the hospital setting. By establishing a weekly 
web-based training forum employing the same technology used for virtual meetings, 
specialty providers at the combat support hospital were able to remotely provide the 
Afghan physicians education and training. Thanks to the technology employed, any 
Afghan provider could access the training from a U.S. base on the network, ask questions 
during the training, and share their experiences.141 By using technology to disseminate 
and facilitate training, the experts/specialists at the hospital provided education without 
having to travel to each of the outlying bases. One can easily imagine similar endeavors 
supported by teleconsultation and collaboration that could sustain partnering relationships 
and augment face-to-face interactions.    
In conclusion, doctrine and current policy guidance directs the military services to 
institutionalize how they plan to create the ability to build partner medical capacity. This 
specialized task requires the cultivation of global health experts who can serve as medical 
advisors to both partner states and military organizations in support of U.S. national 
interests, regional stability, and theater development/security plans. While a cadre of 
global health experts with cultural and linguistic capabilities are key to this endeavor, 
medical strengthening efforts should also leverage the full capabilities and resources of 
military medical departments to reinforce and support advisory efforts. Vertical and 
horizontal integration and coordination of these efforts, as well as the appropriate use of 
networking and medical technology, would ensure their success. Continued guidance and 
development of doctrine specifically directing and supporting BPC in the health and 
medical domain, especially to develop the medical systems of security forces, would not 
only strengthen partner medical sectors, but directly contribute to security and partner 
stability. 
 
                                                 
141. This example is based on a program I established in Afghanistan in 2007–2008. The success of 
the initial event led to subsequent sessions on neonatal resuscitation, pediatric infectious disease, and 
women’s health. 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Strong relationships are critical in order to assist [host nation] security 
forces to improve or establish capacity and capability that suit their 
missions and resources. Acute care of combat casualties, patient 
movement systems, medical logistics, and professional development are 
key components of success. Positive perception of these capabilities 
within security forces can improve health outcomes, enhance morale and 
confidence, and bolster line operator and medic relationships. Respect for 
leadership and the mission may both be enhanced by this attention to 
health issues. 
   –Dr. Edwin K. Burkett, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Global Health Expert142 
  
In theory, building internal capacity in partner states may sometimes eliminate the 
need to deploy U.S. military forces abroad. The wars of the past 12 years have stressed 
the U.S. military, and small-footprint engagements, such as building partner capacity, 
appear to offer a promising solution, if not an antidote, to future military problems. 
Efforts to develop partner security forces through SFA and FID activities, however, have 
overlooked the importance of developing the medical support systems for those forces. 
For its part, U.S. military medicine, influenced by disaster and humanitarian response 
demands, focuses its BPC efforts predominately on strengthening civilian medical 
capacity, as opposed to security force medical care, during stability operations.   
My thesis points to the importance of a strong medical system to support security 
forces and their operations. I have highlighted the direct and indirect benefits to be gained 
from a strong security force medical system, and I have recommended a health 
development framework to strengthen the security force medical system. While 
developing an indigenous, capable, competent medical support for partner security forces 
is not, by itself, sufficient to create or guarantee an effective security force, it is a 
necessary capability that has gone unrecognized and unsupported. This is unfortunate. 
Simply put, security forces will be more effective when assured proper and timely 
                                                 
142. Edwin K. Burkett, “Foreign Health Sector Capacity Building and the U.S. Military.” 297. 
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medical care, and the U.S. should prioritize security force health development during 
partnering engagements.  
Medical support institutions must be strengthened in coordination with other 
aspects of security force development (i.e., leadership, professionalism, logistics, the rule 
of law, tactical training, and proper utilization). Due to the technical nature of medical 
support and the time needed to build medical capability, efforts to strengthen medical 
support organizations must be initiated early in the strengthening efforts. Waiting to 
develop medical support capabilities until the security force is ready to conduct security 
operations will likely result in inadequate medical support and directly impact security 
force effectiveness.   
While there may be criticism about limiting or focusing U.S. medical 
strengthening efforts to support security forces rather than provide direct care, medical 
SFA should be the first priority. As with all development efforts, the initial needs of the 
partner state always overwhelm available resources. Although initially focusing on 
strengthening the partner’s security force medical system will directly support the 
security sector, it will provide indirect benefits to other sectors. In contrast, if 
strengthening efforts focus on the civilian population instead of supporting security, 
security forces will be less effective and will have difficulty establishing security, directly 
degrading the potential success of any public health development program.    
To shift our focus to strengthening security force medical support will require a 
fundamental adjustment in current thinking and plans. While engaging with partner 
civilian and public health systems will continue to be critical, all programs should pass a 
security litmus test: How does this engagement/program support or strengthen the 
security forces?  While training nurse midwives and delivering care to civilians may 
seem ideal for helping to meet the needs of the populace, these needs can and should be 
met by humanitarian and international development actors. Development professionals, 
however, require security to deliver this kind of assistance. This is why it makes sense to 
focus on medical support to security forces, since this focus will directly contribute to 
creating the security conditions needed to allow full spectrum development to occur. 
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To conduct these missions, the U.S. military and its medical systems must 
cultivate a cadre of global health experts who are able to bridge the military-medical gap 
with our partners, be able to advise partners on development, and be able to strengthen 
partners’ security force medical sector. By integrating these advisors vertically and 
horizontally with military organizations and by leveraging technology, strengthening 
efforts can synchronize and create a tipping point for progress and security.  
A. AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research and investigation is needed in multiple areas to support medical 
BPC efforts. The tools and processes to identify, plan, conduct, and evaluate 
strengthening efforts need to be developed, tested, and validated. Efforts to develop and 
standardize measures of effectiveness are needed to facilitate process improvement and 
identify new threats or requirements. The skills, temperament, experience, and required 
training for those participating in strengthening programs must be defined, developed, 
and resourced. As specific requirements will vary based on the role of each participant, 
separate programs of instruction must be developed to create global health experts who 
can serve as advisors and to prepare those who will participate episodically or 
intermittently in these programs. Finally, where and how these efforts are coordinated, 
located, and resourced must be defined in order to maximize support for theater security 
goals and to promote sustainability. Should Civil Affairs or Foreign Area Officer 
programs be expanded to include this capability?  Or should these efforts be housed in an 
independent program administered through U.S. military medical organizations?  Only 
additional research and investigation into these questions and issues will ensure that 
medical BPC contributes to U.S. security and policy in coordination with other efforts to 
build partner capacity. 
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VIII. APPENDIX A: STATISTICS SUPPORTING LARGE-N 
ANALYSIS 
The following sections contain the statistical computations and graphs to support 
hypothesis testing conducted in Chapter 3. All statistical computations were performed 
using Minitab 16 Statistical Software Package. Minitab 16 created all results, tables and 
graphs during statistical testing. 
A. POLICE PRODUCTIVITY WITH AND WITHOUT PHMS  
To investigate whether security forces are more effective when they have 
casualty/trauma care, the following hypotheses were generated: 
H0: Security force productivity is not associated with the availability of 
casualty/trauma care. 
 
HA: Security forces are more productive when casualty/trauma care is 
readily available. 
 
This hypothesis test compared the police productivity data for those countries 
with a PHMS to those with a PHMS. For the data set of countries with police 
productivity metrics that did not have a PHMS, a normal distribution of the data could 
not be assumed since the data set only contained 12 data points. Using a 0.05 level of 
significance, normality testing of this 12-data point set revealed that the data did not 
significantly differ from a normal distribution), so the data was assumed to follow a 



























Probability Plot of PP Rate w/o PHMS
Normal 
 
Given the assumption that both data sets followed a normal distribution, a two-
sample t-test was used to compare the means of the data sets. 
The following chart summarizes the results: 
      
Based on the computed p-value of 0.000, the difference between the two data sets 
was significant. The null hypothesis was rejected and the alternate hypothesis was 
accepted. Therefore, security forces are more productive when casualty/trauma care was 
readily available. 
B. RISK LEVELS WITH AND WITHOUT PHMS 
To investigate whether the level of risk faced by security forces modulates the 
influence of casualty/trauma care on security force effectiveness the following 
hypotheses were generated: 
H0: The level of risk facing security forces does not impact the association 
between higher productivity in states with a PHMS. 
 
HA: The level of risk facing a security force does impact the association 
between higher productivity in states with a PHMS. 
 
This hypothesis test compared the risk/violence levels of countries with 
productivity data and a PHMS to those without a PHMS. For the data set of countries 
 95 
with police productivity metrics that did not have a PHMS, a normal distribution of the 
risk levels could not be assumed since the data set only contained 12 data points. Using a 
0.05 level of significance, normality testing of this 12-data point set revealed that the data 
did not significantly differ from a normal distribution, so the data was assumed to follow 
a normal distribution (p=0.085). The chart below summarizes the normality testing on 
this data set: 
 
 
Given the assumption that both data sets followed a normal distribution, a two-
sample t-test was used to compare the means of the data sets. 
The following chart summarizes the results: 
       
 
Based on the computed p-value of 0.025, the difference between the two data sets 
was significant. The null hypothesis was rejected and the alternate hypothesis was 
accepted. Therefore, the level of risk facing a security force does impact the association 

























Probability Plot of Violence with PP Data w/o PHMS
Normal 
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C. EFFECT OF LEVEL OF RISK ON ASSOCIATION BETWEEN POLICE 
PRODUCTIVITY AND THE PRESENCE OF A PHMS UP TO 2.5% BOV 
To investigate whether the level of risk faced by security forces modulates the 
influence of medical support on security force effectiveness up to a BOV level of 2.5%, 
the following hypotheses were generated: 
H0: The level of risk facing security forces does not impact the association 
between higher productivity in states with a PHMS. 
 
HA: The level of risk facing a security force does impact the association 
between higher productivity in states with a PHMS. 
 
This hypothesis test compared countries with productivity data and a BOV of up 
to 2.5% and PHMS to those without a PHMS. For the data set of countries with police 
productivity metrics that did not have a PHMS, a normal distribution of the police 
productivity could not be assumed since the data set only contained 7 data points. Using a 
0.05 level of significance, normality testing of this 7-data point set revealed that the data 
did not significantly differ from a normal distribution, so the data was assumed to follow 
a normal distribution (p=0.052). The chart below summarizes the normality testing on 





























Given the assumption that both data sets followed a normal distribution, a two-
sample t-test was used to compare the means of the data sets. 





Based on the computed p-value of 0.002, the difference between the two data sets 
was significant. The null hypothesis was rejected and the alternate hypothesis was 
accepted. Therefore, the level of risk facing a security force does impact the association 
between higher productivity in states with a PHMS when the BOV is up to 2.5%. 
D. EFFECT OF LEVEL OF RISK ON ASSOCIATION BETWEEN POLICE 
PRODUCTIVITY AND THE PRESENCE OF A PHMS WHEN THE BOV 
IS GREATER THAN 2.5% 
To investigate whether the level of risk faced by security forces modulates the 
influence of medical support on security force effectiveness above a BOV level of 2.5%, 
the following hypotheses were generated: 
H0: The level of risk facing security forces does not impact the association 
between higher productivity in states with a PHMS. 
 
HA: The level of risk facing a security force does impact the association 
between higher productivity in states with a PHMS. 
 
This hypothesis test compared countries with productivity data and a BOV above 
2.5% and a PHMS to those without a PHMS. For both data sets, a normal distribution of 
the productivity data could not be assumed since each the data set contained less than 30 
data points. Using a 0.05 level of significance, normality testing of both data sets was 
performed. For the data set representing the police productivity levels in countries 
without a PHMS and BOV greater than 2.25% (n=5), normality testing revealed that the 
data set did not significantly differ from a normal distribution, so it was assumed to 
follow a normal distribution (p=0.355). However, the data set representing the police 
productivity levels in countries with a PHMS and BOV greater than 2.25% (n=10), 
normality testing showed that the data significantly differed from a normal distribution 
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and a normal distribution could not be assumed (p<0.005). The charts below summarize 
the normality testing on these data sets: 




















































Probability Plot of PP at Risk > 2.25 BOV w/ PHMS
Normal 
   
 
Because one of the data sets failed to follow a normal distribution, nonparametric 
testing was required to compare the two sample sets. The Mann-Whitney Test was used 
to compare the medians of the two data sets. 
The following chart summarizes the results: 
 
 
Based on the computed p-value of 0.9512, the difference between the two data 
sets was not significant. The null hypothesis was not rejected. Therefore, the level of risk 
facing security forces does not impact the association between higher productivity in 
states with a PHMS when the BOV is greater than 2.5%. 
E. DIFFERENCE IN UNDER-5 MORTALITY FOR STATES WITH AND 
WITHOUT PHMS 
To investigate an association between medical system quality and PHMS 
availability, the following hypotheses were generated: 
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H0: The quality level of the medical system had no impact on the availability 
of a PHMS capability to support security operations. 
 
HA: Higher quality medical systems were more likely to field a PHMS to 
support security operations. 
 
This hypothesis test compared the under-five mortality rates of countries with a 
PHMS to those without a PHMS. A normal distribution of the under-five mortality rates 
were assumed since both data sets contained more than 30 data points. Given the 
normality assumption for both data sets, a one-tailed, two-sample t-test was used to 
compare the means of the data sets. 
The following chart summarizes the results: 
 
 
Based on the computed p-value of 0.000, the difference between the two data sets 
was significant. The null hypothesis was rejected and the alternate hypothesis was 
accepted. Therefore, higher quality medical systems were more likely to field a PHMS to 
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IX. APPENDIX B: NOTES SUPPORTING GAME THEORY 
ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter IV, game theory explored the relationship between security force 
effectiveness and the provision of casualty/trauma support under varying levels of risk. 
This Appendix provides further documentation and/or explanation of concepts introduced 
in Chapter IV. 
B. SOLIDER PREFERENCES WHEN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT HAS A 
LOW RISK OF INJURY 
In a high security environment where the risk of injury is low, the soldier rank 
orders the outcomes in the following way: 
 
 
C. STATE PREFERENCES WHEN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT HAS 
EITHER A HIGH OR LOW RISK OF INJURY 
In a high security environment where the risk of injury to security personnel is 




Soldier Preferences when there is a Low Risk of Injury 
 
4 – Best – Soldier provides security, and state provides casualty support. 
3 – Next Best – Soldier provides security, and state does not provide casualty support. 
2 – Least Best – Soldier does not provide security, and state does provide casualty support. 
1 – Worst –Soldier does not provide security, and state does not provide casualty support. 
 
 
State Preferences for Low and High Risk of Injury 
 
4 – Best – State does not provide casualty support, but soldiers fight. 
3 – Next Best – State provides casualty support, and soldiers fight. 
2 – Least Best – State does not provide casualty support, and soldiers do not fight. 
1 – Worst – State provides casualty support, and soldiers do not fight. 
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D. PLAYER PREFERENCES WHEN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT HAS A 
HIGH RISK OF INJURY 
In a low security environment where the risk of injury is high, the soldier rank 
orders the outcomes in the following way: 
 
 
E. STATE UTILITY VALUE OF POSSIBLE OUTCOMES 
To determine the interval scaling for the state’s outcomes, one must consider the 
primary need and purpose of the security forces. The state has a great interest in the 
establishment of security and must be willing to invest in the establishment and 
resourcing of security forces in order to set the conditions for economic growth and 
peace. With this in mind, an interval scale between zero and one hundred was used to 
represent the state’s preferences. The best option, AD, was given a value of 100 and the 
worst option, BC, was be given the value of zero. The second best option, AC, was given 
a value of 90. In this outcome, the benefit of security greatly outweighed the cost of 
allocating funds to casualty support. Similarly, the least best option, BD, was given a 
value of 10. While the state preferred BD to BC because it would not have to pay for the 
casualty support when soldiers don’t provide security, BD was only slightly better than 
BC due to the continued lack of security. The relationship among the different outcomes 
was illustrated in Figure 7. 
Soldier Preferences where there is a High Risk of Injury 
 
4 – Best – Soldier provides security, and state provides casualty support. 
3 – Next Best – Soldier does not provide security, and state does provide casualty support.  
2 – Least Best –Soldier does not provide security, and state does not provide casualty support. 




Interval scaling of cardinal utilities for state outcomes (From Figure 7) 
 
F. SOLDIER UTILITY VALUE OF POSSIBLE OUTCOMES IN LOW-RISK 
ENVIRONMENT 
Utility theory allows the computation of soldier expected values of the different 
outcomes through the use of a decision tree. The decision tree for soldiers’ expected 
values (Figure 8) permits the manipulation of several variables to determine the expected 
value of different scenarios. On the decision tree, the three variables are the probably of 
injury (x), the probability of surviving an injury if casualty care is provided (y), and the 
probability of surviving an injury if casualty/trauma care is not provided (z).   
 
Decision Tree to Determine Expected Value for Soldier Outcomes (From Figure 8) 
INTERVAL SCALING FOR STATE PREFERENCES 
         
 
DECISION TREE TO DETERMINE SOLDIERS’ EXPECTED VALUES 
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The values listed at the terminal nodes of each decision branch represent the 
relative value of the outcome. Using a scale of -200 to 100, relative values are determined 
according to the following rationale: death always results in -200, and soldiers who 
provide security and are not injured (regardless of the provision of casualty/trauma care), 
rate the outcome as 100 points. Refusing to fight when there is no casualty/trauma care 
support is zero, and refusing to fight when there is medical support results in 10, a 
slightly higher number which reflects the benefit of having access to casualty/trauma care 
in the event they are attacked on their base. Wounded soldiers who survive their injury 
value the outcome based on the provision of casualty/trauma care. If a soldier survives an 
injury with casualty/trauma care, the value is 60. If a soldier survives an injury without 
casualty/trauma care, the outcome is 50, slightly lower to account for greater suffering, 
pain and increased morbidity. 
Stochastic variables are determined based on the scenario. For Game 1 (a scenario 
with a low risk of injury), the risk of injury (x) is 1%. In the second game (a scenario 
with a higher risk of injury), a value of 67% is used. These values are selected to show 
the impact of varying levels of risk and do not specifically represent a specific location or 
situation. A perceived risk of 67%, though, reasonably represents the perception of risk a 
soldier might be caught in an ambush or when defending against a deliberate attack. For 
the survival rates with medical support (y) and without medical support (z), historical 
survival rates are drawn from U.S. military experience in El Salvador during in the early 
1980s. Prior to the efforts of a U.S. Army Mobile Medical Training Team (MMTT) to 
improve security medical support, the survivability rates were 55% (z) for those wounded 
in battle. After the training, survivability rates increased to 95% (y).143 The details of the 
efforts of the MMTT are discussed more extensively in Chapter 4, section G. The level of 
medical support assumed in my analysis could be reasonably provided by trained 
physicians in a developing country and includes the use of antibiotics, plain radiography, 
aseptic surgery, and safe general anesthesia. My analysis does not assume current first 
world standards of care in the United States or those provided by military medical 
                                                 
143. Zajtchuk, Brown, and Rumbaugh, “Medical Success in El Salvador.”  
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support to American soldiers on the battlefield, which would require a greater level of 
medical investment in both personnel and technology (such as advanced surgical 
techniques, MRI/CT scanners, and advanced telemetry).  
Using the decision tree in Figure 9 and the assigned risk levels discussed 





Soldier Values of Outcomes in the Low-Risk Environment – Game 1 
 
AC – The soldiers provide security, and the state provides casualty support. 
     Utility = (0.01*((60*0.95)+(-200*0.05)))+(0.99*100)= 99.47 
     Utility = 99 
 
AD – The soldiers provide security, but the state does not provide casualty support. 
     Utility = (0.01*((50*0.55)+(-200*0.45)))+(0.99*100) = 98.37 
     Utility = 98 
 
BC – The soldiers do not provide security, but the state provides casualty support. 
      Utility = 10 
 
BD – The soldiers do not provide security, and the state does not provide casualty support. 
      Utility = 0 
Soldiers Values of Outcomes in a High Risk Environment – Game 2 
 
AC – The soldiers provide security, and the state provides casualty support. 
     Utility = (0.67*((60*0.95)+(-200*0.05)))+(0.33*100)= 64.49 
     Utility = 64 
 
AD – The soldiers provide security, but the state does not provide casualty support. 
     Utility = (0.67*((50*0.55)+(-200*0.45)))+(0.33*100) = -8.875 
     Utility = -9 
 
BC – The soldiers do not provide security, but the state provides casualty support. 
      Utility = 10 
 
BD – The soldiers do not provide security, and the state does not provide casualty support. 
      Utility = 0 
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G. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ON LEVEL OF RISK 
Sensitivity analysis on the level of risk experienced by the soldiers is conducted to 
determine the level of risk that influenced soldier behavior. The increased level of risk 
between Game 1 and Game 2 results in soldiers’ preferences shifting from providing 
security at all times to only providing security when health support is available. As 
illustrated in Game 1 (Figure 9), soldiers change their strategy when the utility of AD 
falls below the utility of BD. In Game 2 (Figure 10), this change in behavior occurs when 
the expected value for AD becomes negative. Using the decision tree, I compute the level 
of risk (x) that changes behavior by setting the value of the utility function to less than or 
equal to zero (the value of BD) and then solve for x. 
(x*((50*0.55)+(-200*0.45)))+((1-x)*100) ≤ 0 
x ≥ 0.61538 
From this calculation, I estimate that soldiers will stop providing security once the 
risk of injury approaches or exceeded 61%. While this value is specific to the utilities 
established in these games, the ability to calculate a threshold value that results in a 
change in soldier’s behavior is conceptually useful.   
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